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"DISCRIMINATION" UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
By CHESTER C. WARD t
ADMINISTRATION Of the National Labor Relations Act' has entered a
new era under the first sharply-interpretative decisions of the Supreme
Court 2 just as certainly as application of the Act entered a new era under
stimulus of the great constitutional decisions of April, 1937.0 The prin-
cipal changes to evolve in the new phase will center about the National
Labor Relations Board's4 doctrines of "discrimination" under the Act.
They will be wrought chiefly by the Court's delineation of legitimate cause
for discharge of employees under the Act' and by the Court's creation
of a new psychology regarding finality of the Board's findings of fact.'
The heavy and direct impact of the Act on employers is through the
mysteriously phrased unfair labor practice proscribed by Section 9(3)'
and characterized by the Board as "discrimination." The penalty for
fAssistant Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; Associate
Editor, LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER.
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-66 (Supp. 1937) ; hereinafter referred
to as the Act. The purpose and structure of the Act have already been widely discussed.
A bibliography of recent references lists more than 50 articles and 25 books and pamph
lets: NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 289-92, continuing extensive chronologically-
arranged bibliography from SECOND ANrNUAL REPORT (1938) 169-72. A short non-tech-
nical, official explanation of the Act is contained in NLRB FIRST ANNUAL RrPOnT (1937)
9-13. For a graphic account of the Act in action, and of the emotional bias with which it
is viewed, see The G- D- Labor Board (Oct. 1938) FORTUNE 52. A sympathetic
account of the general administration of the Act is contained in Bwoms, U~tmoi' o.
THEIR OWN CHOOSING (1939); a background story by Malcolm Ross, the Board's Di-
rector of Publications, rejoices in the enigmatic title, DEvTH oF A YAL MAN (1039).
2. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Corp., (1939) 6 U. S. L. Wazi 896; N. L. R. B. v. Sand!'
Manufacturing Co., (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 887; N. L. R. B. v. Columbian Enameling
and Stamping Co., (1939) 6 U. S. L. VEK 892, decided by Supreme Court, Feb. 27,
1939.
3. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., and related cases, 301 U. S. 1 (1937),
4. Hereinafter referred as the Board or as NLRB.
5. All three of the decisions of Feb. 27, 1939, sapra note 2, turned fundamentally
on this question.
6. In the Columbian and Sands cases, the Supreme Court for the first time ovetr
turned the Board's findings of fact. Prior to these reversals the Board's record of suc-
cesses before the Court had been so impressive that it was a frequent occurrence for
employers to settle cases of alleged discrimination for amounts ranging from $10,000 to
$51,000, without even going to hearing before the trial examiner. R.. Stearns Coal &
Lumber Co., 11 NLRB, No. 40 (1939); National Tea Co., 9 NLRB, No, 25 (193P)
($51,000). Such settlements totaled $131,083.85 in 1938 for the Board's Second Region
(New York) alone. Report of Regional Director Elinore M. Herrick (1939) 4 L. R. R.
45, 52.
7. Quoted in full infra p. 1155.
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violation of Section 8(1), or (2), or (5), s is an order to cease and
desist. For violation of Section 8(3), however, the penalty has run as
high as a quarter of a million dollars in a single case.0 Thus file arsenal
of the Board, ordinarily restricted to a sort of verbal tear gas-the
cease and desist order-is, in the case of violations of Section 8(3),
implemented by a financial-armor-piercing projectile-the back pay
order.
To employees, also, Section 8(3) is most crucial. If a union employee
is fired, laid off, locked out, or demoted, he may file charges under this
subsection and be ordered reinstated with back pay. Some employees
have received back pay for as long as three and a half years, 10 and they
need not even look for other work to be entitled to such pay." From
this point of view, Section 8(3) protects an employee's job, his living.
Moreover, union officials must know, for the purposes of their strategy
and tactics, what conduct will change the status of their members from
striking employees entitled neither to back pay nor preferential reinstate-
ment to the status of employees "discriminated" against, who are entitled
to back pay and reinstatement. These things depend upon the construc-
tion of Section 8(3). Nor can non-union employees who do not choose
to engage in collective action afford to remain, as they apparently are,
uninformed as to what this subsection means. At a time when protection
of minorities is much before the world, it is surprising that the function
of Section 8(3) in protecting such workers has never been invoked. In
a Statute which commands majority rule,'12 Section 8(3) alone can pre-
vent a union clothed by the Statute with dictatorial power from giving
vent to a human-enough tendency toward seeking vengeance against
employees who refused to join while the union was seeking its majority. 3
For protection in situations where employer tactics directed against union
members catch non-unionists in a cross-fire, Section 8(3) again is the
unaffiliated employee's sole reliance.' 4
Tactically and practically, Section 8(3) appears to be the most im-
portant provision' 5 of the entire Act, as to all persons affected-em-
8. Ibid.
9. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938) ; 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), ccrl. denied, (1939)
6 U. S. L. WEEK 914.
10. In re Colorado Milling and Elevator Co., 11 NLRB, No. 16 (1939).
11. Western Felt Works, 10 NLRB, No. 31 (1938).
12. Section 9(a).
13. Developed infra pp. 1166 et seq.
14. Developed infra p. 1168.
15. Section 8(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to bargain collectively, is the substantive section which embodies the ultimate purpose
of the Act. See Latham, Federal Regulation of Collectcve Bargaining (1937) 6 Gro.
WAsHr. L. REv. 1; Wolf, The Duty to Bargain Collectively (1938) 5 LAw A1nD Co..Tzmp.
PROB. 242. The first four subsections of § 8 are purposed to protect the collective bar-
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ployers, employees, and organizers. The Board has already handled a
total of 20,000 cases involving 5,000,000 workers,1" and approximately
two-thirds of all unfair labor practice complaints filed in 1938 involved
charges under Section .8(3).17 A pressing need exists, therefore, not
only for an examination of the doctrines of "discrimination" evolved by
the Labor Board, with emphasis on their revaluation in the light of the
Supreme Court decisions, but also for a consideration of several im-
portant problems arising under the Act which have not as yet been
adjudicated by either the Board or the courts.
I. WHAT IS THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 8(3)?
On the answer to this question hinges the employer's right to maintain
discipline in the plant, now most disconcertingly vexed by uncertainty,
and his right to select for discharge and hire, since the Court's decisions
of February 27, 1939, protect expressly only the employer's pr6perty
and contract rights. The employee's "right" to his job depends in large
measure upon this definition. Perhaps the whole problem of the sit-
down strike in connection with the Act could best have been settled on
this issue."8 In any event, the question seems fairly raised, since the
Board, in the great preponderance of its cases, administers subsection
(3) as if it read: it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to discriminate because of union activity."' 9 Indeed, the Board tends to
use those very words when it is not concentrating on what it obviously
considers merely formal findings or discussions. 20 Actually, however, the
words of the Statute are quite different.
The Statutory Wording of Section 8(3). Perhaps the best method,
although one may suspect an unusual one, 1 of understanding the con-
gaining process. Since this process will need progressively less protection as it becomes
more widely accepted, and as unions become stronger and more experienced, subsection
(5) will eventually supplant the protective subsections in importance and in impact on
employers. At present, however, that is not the case.
16. NLRB MONTHLY REPORT (Feb. 1939) showed a cumulative total of 19,659
cases, "involving" 4,435,574 workers.
17. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 28.
18. Instead of on the issue of the Board's power to order reinstatement, which was
the ultimate point of decision in the Pansteel case, although the fundamental issue was
the employer's right to discharge employees because of their seizure of the company's
property.
19. See infra pp. 1155 et seq. In its very first decision under the Act, In re Penn-
sylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 NLRB 1, 36 (1933) the Board introduced, with abso-
lutely no explanation or reasoning, "discharge for union activity" as an additional
alternative unfair labor practice to that expressed in the words of Section 8(3).
20. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 81: "The Board's construction of the
scope of § 8(3) . . . briefly (is that) it forbids the employer to affect or change an
employment relation because of union membership or activities." (Italics supplied).
21. Bizarre interpretations of the Act indicate that the courts sometimes read gen-
erally rather than specifically. E.g., Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks,
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mand of the Act, is carefully to read its words in their context (italics
are supplied, and the closed-shop proviso is omitted):
Section 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it: . . . [the grievance proviso follows].
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
inembership in any labor organization: Provided, . . . [the dosed
shop proviso follows].
(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against'an employee
because he has filed or given testimony under this Act.
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a).
First, to meet the argument that there is no substantial difference be-
tween the way the Board interprets subsection (3) and the way Congress
wrote it, subsection (4) is cogent proof that when Congress wanted to
make "discrimination" because of a particular activity an unfair labor
practice, it did so, in just those words. The same simple words were just
as available for the structure of subsection (3). It could have been
written as the Board interprets it, but it just wasn't. Why should it be
assumed that Congress was aimlessly beating about the verbiage bush
to make discrimination because of union activity an unfair practice in
the face of such skillful straight-forward use of the apt words in a
different connection in the next sentence? "2
If Congress had meant to say what the Board says it meant, sub-
section (3) would have read: "To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure
98 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), in which the court amazingly misconstrued the Board's
jurisdiction to depend upon the existence of a "labor dispute" as defined in § 2(9), and
then, more amazingly, misconstrued that definition to require a proximate relation of
employer-employee, after quoting the words of the statute, which are exactly the reverse.
The district court, which had taken jurisdiction on the basis of a highly imaginative
interpretation of § 10(e), decided that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to direct an
election to settle the question of representation, and thereupon helpfully appointed a
special master to conduct an election under the Act. In N. L. R. D. v. Lion Shoe Co.,
97 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938), the court surprisingly declared: "That the ne'v
union, when finally organized, constituted a unit for collective bargaining under § 9(a)
of the Act is dear." Most baffling of all is the court's order in Globe Cotton Mills v.
N. L. R. B., 4 L. R R. 206 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), overthrowing entirely the cease and
desist portions of the Board's order, but enforcing that part granting afirmative relief.
That the Board can order such relief only as supplementary to a cease and desist order
is clear from the most hurried reading of § 10(c).
22. See address by Chairman Madden before American Political Science Assccia-
tion, Columbus, 0., Dec. 29, 1938: The Act is "a model of straight-forward statutory
statement"
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of employment or any term or condition of employment because of labor
organization membership or activities." One reason for the language
actually used may well have been to avoid limiting, any more than neces-
sary for the protection of the rights guaranteed in Section 7, what the
House Report,2" the Board,24 and the Supreme Court2" have character-
ized as "the normal right of employers to select their employees or to
discharge them." Another reason is protection of non-union minorities,
In each of subsections (1), (2), (4), and (5) the definition of the
substantive unfair labor practice follows immediately the word "to";
that is, the conduct which is made the basis of liability for violation of
the Act is described after the word "to" in four out of the five sub-
sections. There is no reason to believe that that is not also true in the
fifth case, that of subsection (3). The unfair labor practice under sub-
section (3), then- the basis of liability- is for an employer "to en-
courage or discourage membership in a labor organization." The words
preceding "to" in subsection (3) must be given effect, then, as a condi-
tion to liability, not as a basis of liability. In other words, "discrinina-
tion" is the proscribed means of encouragement or discouragement of
membership in a labor organization, but the prohibited conduct is the
encouragement or discouragement of membership. The fact that sub-
section (3) was aimed particularly at the yellow-dog contract is highly
significant in emphasizing the membership-protection aspect. Accordingly,
the reports of the Senate" and House27 Committees make it clear that
the proper short statement of subsection (3) is that it "prohibits en-
couraging or discouraging membership in a labor organization by dis-
crimination," and not, as the Board puts it, that it "prohibits discrim-
ination because of union activity.' 2' But after only one year of admin-
istration of the Act, the Board abandoned its original interpretation of
the statutory provision2 ' and introduced an idea of its own."' Despite
the Board's difficulty in finding a satisfactory statement by which to relate
its own views to the words of the Statute, we finally have the Board's
word for it that the sole issue raised by an allegation of violation of
Section 8(3) is whether the discharge involved was because of union
activity.3 Surprisingly enough, this unexplained action of the Board has
23. REPORT OF HousE Co ITTEE oN LABOR, H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) 19.
24. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 69.
25. See N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1. 45-46 (1937).
26. See REPORT OF STATE CommiTTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, SErN. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 10, 11.
27. See REPORT OF HOUSE Com-xMrnmE ON LABOR, H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 19.
28. See In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 NLRB 1, 36 (1933).
29. NLRB FIRsT ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 77.
30. NLRB SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1938) 69.
31. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 27 and (in slightly different words) 81.
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never been challenged by its many critics, nor, so far as appears, has
the Board ever supported its interpretation by explicit reasoning. - Yet
if it be argued that it makes no practical difference that the Board has
brought conduct within subsection (3) which might not be within the
actual words thereof, since the Board could surely bring anything which
it characterizes as "discrimination" within the broad generalization of
"interference" within Section 8(1), the answer is threefold:
First, that the same type of affirmative relief - back pay - may not be
so matter-of-factly enforced by the courts. The Supreme Court has
recently spoken portentously concerning the extent of the Board's power
to order affirmative relief where a finding under subsection (1) was not
reinforced by a finding of a specific unfair practice under one of the
particular subdivisions: "The power to command affirmative action is
remedial, not punitive . "' Certainly one effect of that decision,
giving weight to the Court's stressing of the absence in the Board's
decision of a finding of violation of Section 8(2), was to declare the
Board powerless to order relief in connection with a finding of violation
of Section 8(1) which would have been perfectly appropriate to a finding
of violation of Section 8(2). Furthermore, although the power to order
back pay is expressly granted,"' and is not specifically limited to remedy
violations of Section 8(3), it is linked, perhaps inseparably, to rein-
statement orders, and they seem, of course, to be most appropriate to
remedy the only unfair practice which mentions tenure of employment.
Second, that in any event, the Board has no authority to take any liberties
whatsoever with the wording of the specific unfair labor practices,33 such
as to read into Section 8(3) protection of union activities when member-
ship alone is mentioned, nor to read into it the content of Section 7, if
32. See note 18, supra.
33. N. L. R. B. v. Consolidated Edison Co., (1938) 6 U. S. L. Wmi: 425, 429. In
the Fansteel case, Justice Hughes, explaining and reinforcing the language of the Con-
solidated Edison case, declared: "We held that the authority to order affirmative action
did not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon
the employer any penalty he may choose because he is engaged in unfair labor practices
and the Board is of opinion that the policies of the Act may be effectuated by such an
order." The Board's own policy is not to order back pay without a finding of violation
of Section 8(3). This policy is almost universally present, but is seldom expresssed; in
two instances the Board has departed from it. In re Indianapolis Glove Co., 5 NLRB
231 (1938) ; In re Servel, Inc., 11 NLRB, No. 121 (1939). A more astute technique may
obviate such departures in the future. In re Stehli & Co., 11 NLRB, No. 124 (1939),
34. Section 10(b).
35. See REPORT oF SE..TE COMM EE o1T EDUCATION AND Luon, SE:N. PzR,. xo.
573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935): "The unfair labor practices . . . are strictly limited
to those enumerated in Section 8. . .. Unlike the Federal Trade Commission Act
. . . this bill is specific in its terms. Neither the Board nor the Courts are g9vn any
blanket authority to prohibit whatever labor practices that in their judgn:ent are deemed
unfair." Inclusion of the words "nor the Courts" repels the significance v,hich might
ordinarily attach to the courts' echoing of the Board's language.
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it be argued that that Section declares "rights" to union activities. Third,
that such an interpretation has obscured, and eventually might result
in terminating, the important function of Section 8(3) in protecting
from oppression minorities within appropriate units.
Of course, no one would be fatuous enough to contend that discrim-
ination because of union activities will not constitute a violation of Sec-
tion 8(3) in, say, ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. But this is because
such conduct by an employer ordinarily is purposed to discourage, and
will also have the necessary effect of discouraging, membership in the
union concerned. This explains, perhaps, why the Board for so long
had a perfect record36 in the Supreme Court in cases in which the Board
has found a violation of Section 8(3), and why the Supreme Court at
first echoed the Board's language to the effect that Section 8(3) forbids
discharges because of union activities.37 The point of the actual language
of the Section has never been urged upon the Court, and the Court has
no reason to presume that the Board, the body of experts charged with
administration of the Act, has been torturing the statutory language.
Much more significant than the language used is the fact that in every
case won by the Board the union activities which had been the occasion
of the discrimination were of the type the Court and all fair-minded
persons would necessarily regard as legitimate union activities. When
the union activities concerned consist of violence or illegal conduct, a
different result follows, as the Fansteel case38 clearly establishes.
If it is possible to "discriminate because of union activities" without
"encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor organization", it
would seem to be the duty of the Board in each case of an allegation
of violation of Section 8(3) to look for "substantial" evidence that the
employer's conduct had the effect of such encouragement or discourage-
ment. And the possibility of "discrimination" without "discouragement"
is potential in both the type of union activities concerned and in the
manner in which the discrimination is effected. That discouragement of
union activities does not in all cases have the necessary effect of dis-
couraging membership in the union in question will appear to anyone
capable of imagining a union's engaging in activities, perhaps of a violent
character, which would deter from joining conservative-minded employees
who would otherwise join. But the Board decisions show numerous
instances of types of union activities, even aside from violence, which,
in the interest of maintaining order in the plant so that the work may
go forward, could be made the basis for differentiation in treatment of
36. See note 6, supra.
37. Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103 (1937).
38. The Fansteel opinion at 898-99 declares in effect that the Act protects only
"lawful" union activities.
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the employees engaging in them without having the necessary effect of
discouraging membership in the union concerned.
It became inevitable, as soon as the Board had firmly committed itself
to the doctrine that union "activities" as well as membership were within
the direct protection of Section 8(3), that the question would arise as
to whether all types of union "activities" were so protected. Strange
potentialities still dwell in this question. Bombings, dynamiting, and
sabotage, may, at rare times, aptly be described as union "activities,"
as on the other hand, fatal machine-gunnings may properly be charged
to employers.3 9 These types of activity and personal violence, trespass,
technical trespass, and breach of contract are now established as without
protection under the Act. But there may be a legitimate need for dis-
charges for other reasons. This problem was not expressly settled by the
Court's decisions of February 27, 1939. An evaluation of the Board's
principal cases in this field is therefore indicated.
The Board's most explicit discussion of the problem occurs in In re
Harnischfeger." In that case, the union, which represented a majority
of the employees, decided to protest the refusal of the employer to sign
a contract with the union by instructing the membership to work shorter
shifts. As a result two shifts of employees were present in the plant at
the same time causing "considerable confusion." The employer, there-
upon, discharged all those responsible for having given the instructions,
and contended that "their discharge was necessary if plant discipline was
to be maintained."
But the claim of the employer was as futile as the Board's opinion
is unenlightening. The Board declared first, that if the activity is designed
to carry out a program of the union, it is a "union activity." Second,
that Section 8(3), which nowhere mentions Section 7, embodies, some-
how, all of that Section. Third, that it is not a violation of Section 8(3)
to discharge for "any" (apparently used to mean "all types of") union
activity. Fourth, that the Board must decide what types of union "ac-
tivities" are protected by Section 8(3). The Board therefore is elaborat-
ing on its interpretation that "Section 8(3) prohibits discrimination
because of union activity." It now adds, in effect, "but not all union
activities: just those the Board may subsequently find not to be inde-
fensible." Right here, perhaps, is the key, other than recognition of the
need for protection of non-union minorities, to why Congress did not
use the words which the Board uses in interpreting the enactment of
Congress. As the Supreme Court accurately deduced in the Fansteel case,
Congress certainly was unwilling to restrict an employer to the extent
of preventing discharge for any union activity of whatever type. How-
39. See, for example, the Board's colorful detective story included in its opinion in
In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 NLRB, No. 33 (1938).
40. 9 NLRB, No. 64 (1938).
1159
THE Y4LE LAW JOURNAL
ever, the alternative of restricting that term by the adjective "lawful"
with its completely unpredictable content must have been recognized as
courting destruction of the purposes of the Act in exactly the manner in
which the Clayton Act4 ' was destroyed as "Labor's Magna Charta"
through use of that very word. It is not unsardonic that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter had eloquently pictured the boomerang effects of such statu-
tory restriction some ten years before he joined the Court just too late
to participate in the decisions of February 27, 1939.42 The National
Labor Relations Act is now laid open by those decisions. It may be that
as an expert without peer in the field of labor legislation he would have
shared the thought of Justices Reed 43 and Black that the sit-down could
have been just as eternally damned without carrying so substantial a
part of the Act to Hades with it.
It may well be conceded that the Board has tried to stretch the pro-
tection of the Act too far, without at the same time agreeing that it was
necessary for the Court to go equally far in the other direction and thus
introduce potentially enormous confusion into administration of the Act.
It is one purpose of this article to show that the Act itself definitely
commands a middle course. For instance, it is plain from the Fansteel
group of cases that an employer may discharge for a "tort" or "breach
of contract."' 44 Introduction of such tests must perforce bring confusion,
for the content of those terms is circumscribed only by the concept
of law. A careful construction of the Act, however, would show that
it actually avoids the difficulties presented on the one hand by an attempt
to protect all types of union activities, and on the other by such completely
non-functional and provenly untrustworthy tests as whether the employee
action in question constituted a "tort" or a "breach of contract."
The Act furnishes its own criteria. These are new and functional.
Section 8(3) directly protects only union membership; indirectly it pro-
41. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. § 382 (1935).
42. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 144-146; 160-171,
The language used by the Chief Justice in the Fansteel case is strangely reminient of
that quoted with obvious disapproval at 145n. from an opinion by Pitney, J., dissenting
from Justice Holmes' liberal interpretation of the Clayton Act's protection of Labor, in
Paine Lumber Co. y. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 484 (1917) : "Neither in the language of the
Section nor in the committee reports, is there an indication of a purpose to render lawful
or legitimate anything that before the Act was unlawful, whether in the objects of such
an organization or its members or in the measures adopted for accomplishing them."
43. Justice Reed, who wrote the partially dissenting opinion, did not use those words,
but he did declare that, "Disapproval of the sit-down does not logically compel tile ac-
ceptance of the theory that an employer has the power to bar his striking employee from
the protection of the Act." (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 900.
44. "The Act does not prohibit an effective discharge for repudiation by the employee
of his agreement any more than it prohibits such discharge for a tort committed against
the employer." Roberts, J., citing the Fansteel opinion, in N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg.
Co., (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 887, 889.
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tects union activities only of such a character that the discharge of par-
ticipants therein would "discourage membership in a labor organization."
The criterion of Section 8(1) is slightly more complicated, since it pro-
scribes "interference, restraint or coercion" of employees in the e-xercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. That Section, then, is the only
possible basis for affirmative protection of any kind of strike. It provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted acti'i-
ties, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection." (Italics supplied).
The language "right . . . to engage in concerted activities" appears
at first to include striking. A second reading reveals, however, that the
Section protects in the line of union activities only organirational and
defensive activities - concerted activities "for mutual aid or protection."
The word "protection" should be enough to establish this, but the con-
clusion is reinforced by use of the word "other," which refers back to
"collective bargaining." By familiar principles of statutory construction,
therefore, "other" limits what follows to activities of the same general
nature as collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is essentially peace-
ful - and industrial peace is the purpose of the Act." Sit-down striking,
would, of course, be without the protection of the Act under this inter-
pretation as a violent and, tactically speaking, offensive activity. If the
Board had so construed the Act, the Chief Justice could have had no
occasion in the course of argument of a case under the Act to ask such
embarrassing questions as he did in the Fansteel case,40 nor to write an
opinion which may be seized upon to cripple the Act by lesser judges who
have a congenital if perfectly honest distrust of organized labor.
The opinion in the Fansteel case seems to assume that a "lawful"
strike is within the affirmative protection of the Act. The question does not
appear to be that easy. It may be that there is confusion between protect-
ing striking-as the Board has done, for example, by holding that conduct
of an employer in deliberately frightening peaceful pickets into giving
up picketing constitutes a violation of the Act- and protecting former
45. Declaration of policy in § 1 of NLRB, supra note 1; N. L. R. B. v. Consolidated
Edison Co., (1938) 6 U. S. L. ,VFzsK 425.
46. In the course of the Government's argument in the Fanstcel case, 'Mr. Fahy,
General Counsel of the Board, was asked the following question by the Chief Justice:
"Suppose a strildng employee met his employer on the street and assaulted him, and
suppose the employer had strength enough to say, 'I discharge you,' would the Board
have the power to order his reinstatement?" (1939) 6 U. S. L. WE=n 620. In Ben-
nett-Hubbard Candy Co., 11 NLRB, No. 97 (1939) the employer actually vas clubbed
over the head-by a person unknown-during a strike attended by "considerable vio-
lence" and not caused by any unfair labor practice. The Board ordered te strikers re-
instated, with back pay from the time some were refused reinstatement.
11611939]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
participants in a strike when applying for reinstatement, as the Supreme
Court did in the Mackay case."' True it is that Section 13 expressly
provides that: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," but such
language, although highly emphatic, is entirely neutral as to augmenting
such a right. In any event, although the Court was clearly right in
holding that a sit-down strike is not within whatever protection is ex-
tended by Section 13, the words used by the Court in the particular
connection were unfortunate: "This recognition of the 'right' to strike
plainly contemplates a lawful strike - the exercise of the unquestioned
right to quit work."4 This might introduce into the administration of
the Act all of the confusion of the common labor law as to what con-
stitutes a "lawful" strike and the ends for which men may strike.4 Local
law might prevail by reason of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins." It would
have been more in conformity with the Act to say that if it protects any
striking activity at all, such protection is limited to a strike for "mutual
aid or protection."
But assuming that an ordinary strike is a "concerted activity," as is
declared by Section 7 to be a right of employees, the courts refuse to
construe even Section 8(1) as affording complete protection to it. Hir-
ing strike-breakers, or, to avoid use of a term with such a connotation
of force, new employees during a strike, certainly seems the most effective
way possible to interfere with a strike. Yet the employer's absolute right
to hire such persons during a strike is enunciated in the Mackay case.
The strike in that case was not caused by an unfair labor practice, but
even in cases where such cause is found to exist, the employer still may
hire new employees to take the place of strikers."'
Sound policy underlies the Board's contention that it must protect
union officials under Section 8(3). It is unfortunate that the Board's
best explanation of this appears in In re Shell Petroleum Corporation,8 2
which involved a sit-down strike. The grievance committee of a sub-
local union which was holding employer property during a sit-down strike
refused to permit employer officials accompanied by officers of the parent
local to approach the strikers to explain to them the new working
schedules in protest of which the strike had been called. The employer
discharged the three members of the committee because of this action,
claiming that they were responsible for maintenance of the strike and
47. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
48. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Corp., (1939) 6 U. S. L. WF x 896.
49. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 42, at 1-43.
50. 304 U. S. 96 (1938).
51. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938); Black Diamond
Steamship Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); N. L. R. B. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
52. 10 NLRB, No. 60 (1938).
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the continued holding of the property. The Board held that the discharges
were in violation of Section 8(3), explaining:
"For if union representatives are made to assume tie risk of
personal responsibility for the actions of their union, no employee
of the employer wrill be willing to accept the position of representa-
tive."53
The argument fails in the case in which it is enunciated, of course,
since there it rests on the never reasonably tenable and now completely
destroyed assumption that sit-down striking is a union activity affirma-
tively protected by the Act. It should make excellent sense, however,
in any case in which the strike was non-violent or not in breach of a
contract.
A typical example of a perfectly legitimate union "activity" which
could not be the occasion for discrimination without a resulting discour-
agement of membership in the union concerned is found in the Kelly-
Springfield Tire Company case."4 The discharged employee was chairman
of the union grievance committee in his department. The employer char-
acterized the employee's activity as "anmateur detective work and snooping
around and gathering complaints." In this situation the same result
would be reached by application of any interpretation of Section 8(3).
The Court would hold that the employee was within the protection of
the Act, since his activity was "lawful." Application of the theory herein
advanced would show a discouragement of union membership by the
discrimination through depriving members of legitimate and defensive
benefits of such membership - representation in presentation of griev-
ances. The Board held that the discharge was in violation of the Section
simply because the activity was a union activity.5
Resort by an employer to promulgating in advance regulations pro-
scribing union activities will not necessarily solve his problems of disci-
pline. The Board has never denied an employer's right to make such
rules and regulations, and it professes not to "attempt to interpret em-
ployers' rules or pass upon their reasonableness,""0 but more often than
53. Id. at 11.
54. 6 NLRB 325 (193S), consent decree, Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
97 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
55. Id. at 331.
56. In re Montgomery Ward and Co., 4 NLRB 1151, 1156 (1938). But cf. In re
American iLfg. Concern, 7 NLRB 753, 760 (1938). "The fact that the respondent sought
to justify its action by promulgating a plant rule does not alter our conclusion, since an
employer cannot, in the name of a plant rule, coerce his employees for the purpose of
discouraging collective activity."
In the Botany Worsted Mills case, 4 NLRB 292, 300 (1937), the Board concluded
that Peidl's discharge was in violation of Section 8(3) of the Act, although it conceded
that the alleged rule prohibiting outside activities during working hours wvas in itself
unobjectionable and within the company's lawful power to adopt and discharge. But
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not the Board's decisions have been to the effect that, in the case of a
particular discharge, the purported resort to enforcement of the regula-
tions was "merely a pretext to conceal the anti-union motive for the
discharge." The same technique could be used by the Board if rules were
incorporated into a "contract" in an attempt to rely upon the language
of the Sands case.
Turning from employers' problems of discipline and the types of union
activities which could be made the basis of discriminatory treatment
without necessarily having the effect of discouraging union membership,
to possible methods of discrimination which could be used without neces-
sarily discouraging union membership, the Board's cases show that it
flatly denies the possibility of any such methods. The Board has long
adhered to the position that it is immaterial whether or not just cause
for discharge exists if the discharge is even partly motivated by anti-
union bias."' This goes much farther, of course, than the Board's familiar
doctrine that the mere existence of just cause is no justification for a
discharge." That doctrine is obviously properly applicable wherever the
discharge in question discouraged union membership and the existing
proper reason for discharge was merely an afterthought 0 or even a one
hundred per cent pretext. But where there "are two or more reasons"
and only one of them is union affiliation or activity, and the Board, with-
out considering evidence as to whether the discharge did discourage union
membership or activity, holds it in violation of Section 8(3), with
concomitant liability for reinstatement and back pay, it seems entirely
too much like punishing an employer for anti-union thoughts. It may
be doubted that Congress intended to reach that far. The manner or
method of the discrimination in these cases almost assures that there
will be no effect of discouragement of union membership. There exists
a perfectly good and publicized reason for the discharge; it is given out
to the employee directly concerned and to his fellows. The secret anti-
union part of the motive is known only to the employer - for the par-
ticular reason that he does not want to incur liability under the Act. But
in In re Midland Steel Products Co., 11 NLRB, No. 112 (1939), the Board declared:
"We have grave doubts that the solicitation of union members on an employer's property
on his own time is subject to lawful prohibition by an employer."
57. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 70.
58. Discharge of an employee because of union activity may constitute discriniina-
tdon within § 8(3) regardless of "proper causes" for discharge then existing. In re Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., 6 NLRB 325, 342 (1938) ; In re Arcade Sunshine Co., 12 NLRB
(1939). Cf. In re Wald Transfer Co., 3 NLRB 712 (1937) (failure of an employer
to reinstate union leaders while restraining other union members after walkout for reasons
not connected with any union purpose held a violation of § 8(3) -even though employer
was justified in replacing immediately with outsiders all employees who walked out).
59. The Board frequently and soundly rejects as justification any reason for a dis-
charge discovered only after the event. These attempts are characterized as "after-
thoughts". For example, In re Empire Furniture Corp., 10 NLRB, No. 92 (1939).
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assume that the Board finds it out on cross-examination at a hearing.
The Board will find a violation of Section 8(3). It is true that in such
cases there is an intent, but it is an intent to discriminate, not an intent
to discourage union membership, and there is no discouragement in fact.
Thus the Board under this doctrine not only makes an anti-union-activities
motive in connection with a discharge an extra-statutory basis of liability
under Section 8(3), but makes also any motive other than a one hundred
per cent non-anti-union motive similarly a basis for liability.C
One further interpretation which may be viewed as stretching too far
in one direction the unfair labor practice under Section 8(3) should be
explored before turning to that unique function of the Section which, far
from being stretched at all, has never yet been invoked. The Board, if
it ever has occasion, may say that it is not necessary that an employer's
discriminatory conduct be successful in discouraging union membership
in order to constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8(3). The
Board has held that an employer's conduct with respect to a labor organ-
ization need not be successful in bringing into being a dominated labor
organization,' or, indeed, have any effect at all, 2 in order to constitute
an unfair practice under Section 8(2). With equal assurance the Board
has held that a showing of a concurrent cause operating independently
toward the same end as conduct of an employer is no defense to a charge
of interference, "since it is an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of Section 8(1) for an employer to interfere with the rights of his
employees guaranteed in Section 7 irrespective of the success of such
interference." '
But merely because that theory fits nicely subsections (1) and (2)
of Section 8 is no indication that it may be applied to subsections (3)
and (5). Both subsections (1) and (2) prohibit specifically the "suc-
cessful" conduct which the Statute seeks to eliminate, and then in effect
add, "or attempts at such conduct" by introducing "interference" as an
alternative basis of liability. In subsection (1) the words "restrain" and
"coerce" each carry the connotation of something accomplished; and
"interfere with" is an added precaution against attempts to restrain or
coerce. Section 8(2) seeks to abolish company-dominated unions as a
recognized obstacle to collective bargaining, so it uses the word "dom-
inate," and adds as a safeguard against attempts at such domination the
alternative "or interfere with." But it would be absurd to suppose that
Section 8(5) makes it an unfair labor practice unsuccessfully to attempt
to refuse to bargain collectively. So it is with Section 8(3). The result
60. See note 57, supra.
61. In re Millfay Mlfg. Co., 2 NLRB 919 (1937) ; see In re Canvas Glove Iffg. Co.,
1 NLRB 519, 526 (1936).
62. In re Emsco Derrick Co., 11 NLRB, No. 17 (1939).
63. In re Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 10 NLRB, No. 116 (1939).
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there sought to be abolished was discouragement or encouragement of
membership in any labor organization. An unsuccessful intermeddling
may amount to interference, but a discouragement that fails of any dis-
couraging effect is, by definition, not discouragement. It might amount
to "interference," but Congress significantly left any such word out of
Section 8(3). The strictest interpretation of Section 8(3) would, of
course, require not only proof that membership in a union was in fact
encouraged or discouraged, but also a specific intent to bring about that
result. Such an intent could not be shown by substantial evidence in the
union activities-employer discipline cases considered above. 4
The Unused Function of Protection of Non-Union Minorities. The
perhaps sorely needed but as yet uninvoked protection afforded non-union
minorities is found in Section 8(3)'s proscription of encouragement by
an employer of membership in any labor organization. Most significant
is the failure to make any exception for the benefit of majority unions
except as to closed shop contracts." If, therefore, Section 8(3) is
properly invoked and properly construed, only by securing a closed shop
contract can a union deny to non-union minorities the fruits of collective
bargaining. To illustrate, if a majority union, by reason of its superior
economic power and favored position under the Act, has overcome an
employer's resistance to any type of contract other than one containing
a closed shop clause, and has secured an agreement requiring, for members
only, wage increases, minimum guaranties, or vacations, is it an unfair
labor practice for the employer to fail to grant similar concessions to
non-union employees, even though the contract purports to restrict them
to union members? Obviously the answer is yes. Section 8(3) by
clear terms permits an employer to encourage membership in any union
by discrimination in regard to hire, or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment, only indirectly by making an agree-
ment with a labor organization which is the free and uncoerced repre-
sentative of the majority of employees "to require as a condition of
employment membership therein," and in no other way whatsoever. And
a contract either more than or less than a closed shop contract is no
justification, nor does it matter that the union concerned is a bona fide
majority union. The problem is important because it is highly probable
that many contracts now in effect secure special favors for union mem-
64. Discussed supra pp. 1158 et seq.
65. The closed-shop proviso appended to the substantive provision of § 8(3) reads:
"Provided that nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of em-
ployment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in Section 9(a) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit cov-
ered by such agreement when made."
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bers. 61 In such a situation, although the Board has never mentioned it,"'
the non-union employees are clearly entitled to file charges of violation
of Section 8(3), and the Board, to maintain a consistent position with
its remedies in discouragement cases, would have to order differential
back pay if union members had been receiving higher wages for the
same work. More frequently the Board would have to order accrued
vacations or overtime-off, since those are typical advantages which unions
attempt by contract to corner for union members.
Section 8(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)."
Section 9(a) provides:
"Representatives designated . . . by the majority . . . shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees . . . for the
purposes of collective bargaining."
Thus Section 9(a) confers upon the majority union power to bargain
for all of the employees. But no one can compel" s the union to exercise
this power: that is the gist of the problem. For an employer to refuse
to bargain with a majority union for its members only does not, how-
ever, appear to be an unfair labor practice. The employer's duty under
Section 8(5) is made subject to the provisions of Section 9(a). That
Section provides that the majority union "shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees." So, if the majority union refuses to
proceed under Section 9(a), one of the conditions to the existence of
the employer's duty under Section 8(5) is not met. Therefore an em-
ployer can, if the Act is so construed, refuse with legal impunity to
enter into any negotiations at all concerning a members-only contract,
even with a majority union.
Recent Board decisions foreshadow a situation in which not only
unaffiliated employees but also members of a majority union at a par-
ticular plant of a large company may need the protection against nego-
tiation of discriminatory contracts which is found only in Section 8(3).
The Board is showing an increasing tendency toward finding that all
plants of large manufacturing companies together constitute a single unit
appropriate for collective bargaining." This has been true even though
66. A recent representation case before the Board, for example, involved a contract
denying seniority privileges to non-members. In re Reading Transportation Co., 10
NLRB, No. 2 (1938).
67. The Board is under no duty to do so. If it did, unions would not be pleased at
losing one of their best membership campaign arguments.
68. The Board has devised at least one persuader: it will reduce an exclusive rep-
resentation contract to the status of a contract for members only. See note 66, Lstpra.
69. In re Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 10 NLRB, No. 102 (1939); In re Libtzy-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 10 NLRB, No. 134 (1939); a similar situation may exist vhere
the Board has found that a multi-employer unit is appropriate, and many plants are
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the plants are hundreds of miles apart and are operated independently
of each other.70 The Board holds that it does not matter that all or
practically all of the employees at one plant 71 belong to one union and
desire a separate unit if a rival union has organized the majority of the
employees in all the plants considered as a single unit. The Board's
theory is excellent. Undoubtedly, granting the desire of the employees
in the one plant for a separate unit would prevent presentation of a united
front in collective negotiations with the employer and thus "inevitably
hamper and obstruct the far larger number of the company's employees
at the other plants in their efforts to organize and bargain collectively." 72
The employees at such a single plant may, however, be glad to find in
Section 8(3) protection from oppressive bargaining by the rival union,
which, by the Board's decision, is now made their exclusive representative,
In sharp contrast to the complete absence of any Board decisions
applying Section 8(3) to protect minorities in any of the three situations
discussed above, is the wealth of cases wherein the Board has invoked
the Section to protect members of one of two rival unions in a single
plant.7" The Board's position in such cases is thoroughly sound. The
true statutory basis of liability is applied, with the explanation: "The
employer's act of favoritism toward either union necessarily encourages
membership in the favored union and discourages membership in the
disfavored union." 4 Thus Section 8(3) may, if invoked, function to
protect minorities from oppression at the hands of majority unions."
But it also may serve to protect unaffiliated employees caught in the ever-
unenviable position of the innocent bystander. A surprisingly recurrent
situation has been that in which an employer has shut down a plant or
a department in order to lock out union members or to discourage union-
ization. Where the Board finds those facts, it orders back pay for the
complainant unionists.76 Are non-union men employed in the same plant
solidly affiliated with a union which does not have a majority of all the employees in all
of the plants of all of the employers covered into the unit. The Board has had a number
of such cases: In re Admiar Rubber Co., 9 NLRB, No. 35 (1938) ; In re Hyman-Michaels
Co., 11 NLRB, No. 60 (1939).
70. In re Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 10 NLRB, No. 102 (1939).
71. About 1300 out of 1600 in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case and 133 out of
134 in the Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. case.
72. In re Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 10 NLRB, No. 102 (1939); similar language
is used in the Libbey-Owens-Ford case; all of which seems somewhat inconsistent with
the Board's famous Globe doctrine of self-determination of homogeneous groups. In re
Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294 (1937).
73. Cases cited NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPoRT (1939) 68n.
74. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 68.
75. This might well be pointed out as negativing the need for proposed amendments
to protect coercion from "any source," since it takes care of the most pressing of the
alleged needs in this line.
76. In re National Motor Bearing Co., 5 NLRB 409 (1938) ; In re Ford A. Smith,
1 NLRB 950 (1936).
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or department, who also were deprived of their wages by the same con-
duct of the employer, to get nothing? That has been the answer thus
far."7 The Board has proceeded on the theory that it could not enter
any order affecting the status of employees not named in the complaint,
and, since in each case it has been the union which filed the charges,
only union members have been named in the complaint. This reasoning
of the Board is highly inconsistent with the position it takes in awarding
relief to union members not named in the complaint and to non-union
strikers. The Board does not declare itself helpless in those cases." In
at least one case involving the right of a non-striking, non-member of
a union to relief in a lock-out situation, the Board seems to have ignored
the Act entirely.7" Certainly there is nothing in the Act which com-
mands employees to engage in "union activities," or deprives them of
rights under the Act if they fail to do so. Consequently, whenever the
Board holds that a shut-down constitutes a lock-out in violation of
Section 8(3), non-union employees should be entitled to the same reme-
dies, including reinstatement and back pay, as those ordered for the
union members. As the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has accurately stated:
"There is nothing in the Act which limits the reinstatement remedy
to members of labor organizations or even to striking employees who
are primarily an dircctl, aggricvcd by an unfair labor practice wlde:
canses a strike."80 (Italics supplied).
The words of the court indicate a clear understanding that the Act
can and should be administered to protect the non-union, non-striking
"innocent bystander" employees caught in a cross-fire between employer
and union.
77. It may be that the Board has included non-union employees in bal: pay orders
in this situation (it always includes non-union as well as union strikers if a strike is
involved), but if so the writer has not been able to discover it. The order in In re Som-
erset Shoe Company, 5 NLRB 486, 495 (1938), sounds as if it did, since it decrees back
pay for "all employees who were laid off by reason of the shut-down on March 24,
1937." However, that case ms decided the very day following the deci'ion in In re
National Motor Bearing case, 5 NLRB 409 (1938), and there is no indication in the
opinion of any change in the Board's policy in this respect. It may be that the term
"all employees" referred to all union employees, or to all union employees named in the
complaint, or it may have happened that all the employees were union members.
78. In re Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 8 NLRB 336 (193S) (reinstating
union members not named in complaint); In re Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 4 XLRB
679 (1937) (reinstating strikers who were not members of the union), enforced in
N. L. R. B. v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
79. See In re Ruehne Mfg. Co., 7 NLRB 304, 33 (1938) (employee in effect
penalized for not participating in a sit-down strike).
80. N. L. P. B. v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 96 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933),
98 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
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II. PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN DECISIONS UNDER SECTION 8(3)
"DISCRIMINATION" AS A TERM OF ART. Because "discrimination" is
generally treated by the Board as the basis of liability under Section
8(3), and because the exact words of the Section make it at least an
essential condition of liability thereunder, the Board's working defini-
tion of "discrimination," as enunciated in its decisions, is of great practical
moment. Especially is this true because the Board has made the word
into a term of art with a content surprisingly wider than ordinary. Lay
and legal definitions generally agree that "to discriminate" means "to
make a difference or distinction in treatment."" Thus two elements
seem to be of the essence -differentiation, and affirmative action in the
making thereof. But neither of these is regarded by the Board as a
necessary ingredient of discrimination within the Board's interpretation
of Section 8(3). The three types of cases which raise the question happen
to be among the most important, from a financial viewpoint, of all the
types of cases handled by the Board, since they generally involve large
groups of employees rather than individuals. In cases of one of these
types the Board finds a violation of Section 8(3), although no difference
is made in the treatment of union members and non-union employees.
In cases of the second type, "discrimination" is found, although the
employer's conduct is, in the strictest view, a nonfeasance. In cases of
the third type, all of a class of employees are held to be victims of dis-
crimination because of action against several of their number.
(1) "Discrimination" without a difference. The situation character-
ized by the Board as a "mass discharge" throws most brilliantly into
relief the delineation of discrimination without differentiation. In the
early case of Ford A. Smithi 2 the Board held that the closing of a
partially organized plant, purportedly because of rising costs of produc-
tion, "must be regarded as a mass discharge aimed solely at those among
them who favored the Union." But the plant's closing took effect on
non-union employees as well. In In re National Motor Bearing Com-
81. Webster's New International Dictionary (Merriam Series). Prior to the Act,
court cases defining "discrimination" generally dealt with common carriers, at common
law or under federal statutes. Most of them stressed the element of difference in treat-
ment, e.g., "The word 'discriminate' may be defined as treating one differently from an-
other." Wimberly v. Georgia So. & F. Ry. Co., 5 Ga. App. 263, 266, 63 S. E. 29, 31
(1908). "'Discrimination' means to make a difference between . . ." Wynn v. Wabash
R. Co., 111 Mo. App. 642, 648, 86 S. W. 562, 563 (1905). Litigation of collective bar-
gaining contracts has brought the term before the courts in a setting somewhat similar
to its use in the Act: e.g., in Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. V.
(2d) 692 (1928) (refusal to permit discharged employee to return to work solely be-
cause he was an officer of a labor union was held to constitute "discrimination" as used
in contract). In such cases, however, "discrimination" is the forbidden conduct, whereas
in the Act it is encouraging or discouraging membership in unions which is proscribed.
82. 1 NLRB 950 (1936).
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pany,s3 the management claimed that the plant had been shut downrt
because of an alarming drop in the rate of production and because of
rumors that a sit-down strike was imminent. The opinion of the Board
pointed out the absence of differentiation between union and non-union
workers, but nevertheless found a violation of Section 8(3) in that
the lockout was aimed at the union.8 4
(2) "Discrimination" by nonfeasance. Frequently the Board has held
that an employer, whose unfair labor practices have caused a strike, has
been guilty of discrimination by failure or refusal to displace new em-
ployees 5 to provide positions for the replacement of strikers immediately
upon their request."s The Board is well backed by court authority for
this type of ruling, particularly the Black Diamond Steamship case.- The
Board explains in greater detail elsewhere that failure to displace new
employees "in effect and in result" discriminates in regard to hire and
tenure of employment against striking employees and in favor of em-
ployees "whose position was one of sufferance, without greater right to
their positions than their employer's defeasible right to employ them
could afford.""s Such a discrimination, the Board concludes, discourages
union membership.
(3) "Discrinduation!' taking effect vicarious . Under ordinary and
conventional meanings of the term "discrimination," no one could be
heard to say that someone had discriminated against him by unfavorable
action against a third party. Yet the Board has held that an employer
"discriminated" against all of his striking employees by permitting a com-
mittee of "loyal" employees to refuse the reinstatement of strikers who
had been active on the picket line while permitting the reinstatement of
83. 5 NLRB 409 (1938).
84. A similar result was reached by the Board in In re Somerset Shoe Co., 5 NLRB
486, 491 (1938) and in In re Patriarchia Store Fixtures, Inc., 12 N.LR.B., No. 11 (1939).
85. "New employees" include also persons formerly but not recently employed by
the employer who were last hired after the strike. In re Acme Air Appliance Co., 10
NLRB, No. 123 (1939).
86. I; re McKaig-Hatch, Inc., 10 NLRB, No. 4 (1939); In re Western Felt Works,
10 NLRB, No. 31 (1939); In re Denver Automobile Dealers Ass'n, et al., 10 NLRB,
No. 108 (1939); In re Bennett-Hubbard Candy Co., 11 NLRB, No. 97 (1939). In re
Trenton Garment Co., 4 NLRB 1186 (1938). In In re General Shoe Corp., 5 NLRB
1005 (1938), the Board held that the employer's inaction in the face of activities of
"bouncer squads" of inside union adherents in ousting outside union members from the
plant constituted a "delegation of authority" to the "bouncer squads," in -viewv of its
"affirmative duty to protect its employees during working hours and to maintain safe
working places for them." An additional type of discrimination by non-feasance is created
in In re Asheville Hosiery Co., 11 NLRB, No. 122 (1939), holding that an employer's
failure to protect union employees against an anti-union faction "amounts to a discrimina-
tion in regard to a term or condition of employment", in violation of Section 8(3).
87. Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. N. L R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
88. In re McKaig-Hatch, Inc., 10 NLRB, No. 4 (1939).
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"neutral" strikers who had not taken part in such activities.80 Although
the Board may find sound basis in the Act for its rulings in the cases
discussed in paragraphs (1) and (2) above, this third departure seems
to be an unjustified stretching of the definition. Differentiating action
does not constitute discrimination against an employee unless it impinges
upon his individual rights under the Act. There is no question in this
type of case that the strike leaders are discriminated against (under the
Court's decisions, justifiably so if there has been violence or technical
trespass) by refusing to reinstate them, but as to other strikers who are
offered reinstatement, the most that could be said is that there has been
a violation of Section 8(1).
TYPES OF DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT. "Most commonly the employer's
act of discrimination," the Board explains, "consists in outright discharge,
either individually or in groups."9 But a wide variety of other dis-
criminatory acts are included also in the sweeping words of the Section,
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment." Thus the Board includes lay-off, refusal
to reinstate, demotion, transfer, and refusal to employ, among the other
classifications of frequent conduct which, when coupled with anti-union
motivation, constitutes discrimination.0
(1) "Discharges" during strikes. A fine distinction of financial im-
portance is drawn by the Board in cases involving alleged discriminatory
discharges in the course of strikes. The situation at first seems enormous-
ly confused by apparently cryptic utterances of the Board, sometimes
that the employer really doesn't mean it when he says "All strikers are
hereby discharged," even if he has his attorney say it for him; and other
times that an employer has "discharged" all of the strikers although he
has not said so. The distinction, the Board explains, 2 is between mere
"tactics" and an "effective discharge." Unfortunately for the sake of
easy clarification, the term "effective discharge" is not nearly so accurate
as it sounds. Chief among the Board's articles of faith, and well sup-
ported by the Court's decision in the Mackay case, is that the definition
of "employee" in Section 2 (2) of the Act renders an employer powerless
to destroy "employee status" during a strike."3 The Fansteel opinion
89. In re Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252, 1269 (1938).
90. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL RE:PORT (1939) 72.
91. Ibid. Difficulty arises however in the question whether the action by the em-
ployer "did or did not effectuate or constitute a change in an employment relatlon.hip."
92. Id. at 76-77. The Board abandoned this theory of a "tactical" but not "actual"
discharge in the course of the argument before the Supreme Court in the Fansteel case,
but probably did so for the purposes of that argument and that case only.
93. The Board's position is most succinctly stated at NLRB THiRt ANNUAL Rirronv
(1939) 77n.: "Whether the employer's purported discharge or purported refusal to re-
instate is mere 'tactical step' or a genuine declaration, it can have no effect on the em-
ployee's status as conferred upon the employee by Section 2(3) of the Act." Cited ag
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quotes with fine approval language of the Mackay case to that effect, and
so the Fansteel doctrine will affect necessarily only cases wherein the
strikes involved are not "lawful." Sit-downs were a dying vogue many
months past and appear finally to be smothered by the weight of the
Chief Justice's words and the economic penalties resulting from loss of
rights under the Act.9 However, other varieties of strikes have always
provided the really wide area for application of the Board's doctrine of
the "tactical" strike. Board statistics showed" a markedly increasing
tendency of unions to resort to procedure under the Act, instead of
trying a strike first, as enforcement of the Act became effective follow-
ing the Court's decisions of April, 1937. This tendency probably will
reverse when enforcement bogs down with the wider and more frequent
court review which will result from the psychological effects of the
Fansteel, Sands, and Columnbian cases and the first application of the new
evidence sufficiency tests to the Board's findings of fact.90 The Board
will doubtless persist in applying the doctrine that a discharge is not
effective wherever an employer purports to discharge strikers who have
not engaged in violence gr broken a contract. The prime reason for the
doctrine is, of course, to preserve the Board's power to order rein-
statement.
In some cases, however, the doctrine of the "tactical" discharge has
quite another function. The symmetry of the Board's decisions requires
back pay orders in all cases of discriminatory discharge, yet a mass order
for back pay would be impolitic in many situations. On the other hand,
the Board is so shocked at some types of employer conduct in the course
of strikes that it may wish temporarily to lay aside the doctrine that
"employee status" cannot be destroyed within such a period, so that back
pay may be ordered as a fitting remedy. Since the distinction between
the "tactical" and the "effective" discharge is more imaginary than real
direct authority for this is N. L. R B. v. Carlisle Lumnber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938).
The Board takes the further view that the Act entitles strikers to a reasonable assur-
ance of reemployment, and that to threaten them with discharge is a violation of § 8(1).
In re Acme Air Appliance Co., 10 NLRB, No. 123 (1939).
94. The only major sit-down recently in progress terminated immediately upon an-
nouncement of the Fansteel opinion (Bendix Corporation plant at South Bend, Ind.)
(1939) 4 L. R. R. 3. Also an employer in Newark immediately announced to strikers
whose sit-down had recently terminated that they were discharged. The union asserted
that it would ignore this as a mere incident in the strike, thus showing labor's pressure
for a distinction between "tactical" and "real" discharges such as the Board maintains.
The legal penalties for sit-downs are drastic. Ark v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 295
Ill. App. 323 (1938), cert. denied, (1939) 6 U. S. L. WAai 853; Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, E. D. Pa., Apr. 24, 1939, 4 L. R. R. 320.
95. NLRB Tiam AN -uAL REPORT (1939) 1.
96. Ward, Proof of Discrinhization under the National Labor Relations Act (May,
1939) 7 GEo. WAS. L. R v.
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because of the indestructibility of status doctrine, this distinction lends
itself easily to manipulation one way or the other depending whether or
not the Board wishes to lay a foundation for a back pay order. A com-
parison of cases reaching opposite results shows the Board's doctrines
in action. 7 Although, on one hand, the discharge "in name only" has
appeared harmless to the employer charged under a Section 8(3) com-
plaint,"' on the other hand the Board's contrarywise decisions growing
out of such discharge are of great financial and strategic importance
to employers, employees, and unions."9
The vacillating character of the Board's decisions on this point is shown
by the reasoning in ln re Stackpole Carbon Company.0 The strikers
had been given checks marked "paid in full" and were told that they
would never get back in the plant, but the Board declared:
"The complaint alleges that the respondent discharged its striking
employees. The facts . . . do not sustain the allegation. After
ceasing work the position of the respondent's striking employees
was, from a Practical point of view, unaffected by the acts com-
plained of. Since they had already ceased their work, there is no
question of discriminatory discharge; the que~tion arises only as to
whether there was a discriminatory refusal to reinstate them to their
former employment." (Italics supplied). 1°1
That case seems to be out of line, however, and a discriminatory mass
discharge of strikers has been found in several cases. This results in
the anomalous, or at least unique, holding that strikers not shown to be
willing to resume work are entitled to back pay. (Ordinarily the Board
carefully avoids reaching such a result, holding, for instance, that em-
ployees on strike because of the employer's unfair labor practices may
not condition a request for reinstatement such as will entitle them to
back pay on the employer's ceasing such unfair practices). 102 Signing
during a strike by an employer of a closed shop contract with a rival
union having no majority in the plant is also treated by the Board as
97. But no sit-down cases will be considered since that field is closed to the doctrine
by the Fansteel decision.
98. In re Biles Lumber Co., 4 NLRB 679 (1937), enforced in N. L. R. B. v. Biles
Lumber Co., 96 F. (2d) 197, (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), 98 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938),
and Board rejected the contention that there was a discriminatory discharge within
§ 8(3), and held that it was "only a threat" and had been so construed by the strikers.
In re American Mffg. Concern, 7 NLRB 753 (1938) the Section 8(3) complaint was
dismissed on the ground that the discharge was not real but merely tactical.
99. See NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPoRT (1939) 77-78.
100. 6 NLRB 171 (1938).
101. Id. at 198.
102. In re Fansteel Corp., 5 NLRB 930 (1938), en! orcemnent denied on other grounds
in N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 896; this type
of ruling is discussed infra p. 1177.
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a mass discharge of all strikers, and back pay may be ordered to run from
the date of the signing of the contract.
10 3
(2) General content of term "discharge." When a strike is not cur-
rent, no difficulty is presented in cases turning on the obvious types of
discharge, from the formal notification on a blue slip, to the crisp "you're
fired" of an authorized foreman. In this situation the Board never denies
face value to affirmative words of discharge, as it sometimes does if
similar words are used during a strike. Where a discriminatory dis-
charge is complained of, a "discharge" must be proved, so neither mere
threats of discharge nor an unreasonable belief by an employee that he
has been discharged will be sufficient to support such a complaint.1 But
in addition to the out-and-out or obvious type of discharge, the Board
recognizes a number of different types of constructive discharge. Thus,
an employer "precipitating an emotional crisis making it impossible for
the girls to continue working," "constructively" and discriminatorily dis-
charged them, within Section 8(3), although they quit their work under
such compulsions. 105 A demotion inducing a resignation is also held to
be equivalent to a discharge if the demotion was made because of union
activities.10 6 Similar results are reached by the Board in cases in which
it appears that an employee has been coerced into quitting107 by transfer
or other discriminatory treatment. 08
103. 7 NLRB 304 (1938), summarized at NLRB Tuini AmmArL Ro.xrr (1939)
77. It re Jacob A. Hunkele, 7 NLRB 1276 (1938); cf. In re Williams Coal Co., cf al.
(case of Grapevine Coal Co.), 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939), the Board held that effectuat-
ing the closed shop agreement subsequent to the strike was equivalent to a refusal at
that time of an application by the striking employees for reinstatement (although they
in fact made no application), and such "refusal" to reinstate was a "discharge" which
could be the basis for back pay from that date. Cf. In re Shellabarger Grain Products
Corp., 8 NLRB 336 (1938), in which back pay was ordered to run from the date
of imposition of a condition of reemployment of strikers which "had the effect of deny-
ing striking employees employment if and when they ceased striking."
104. Employees who were threatened with discharge were not justified in consider-
ing themselves discharged. In re Trenton Garment Co., 4 NLRB 118, 1192 (1933).
However, it does not matter that an employee may have been mistaken in his belief that
he had been discharged, if the employer intended to create an impression that he would be
discharged because of his union membership, and the employer "tacitly acquiesced" in
the employee's understanding that he had been discharged. In re Planters Iffg. Co., 10
NLRB, No. 61 (1938). The general problem is discussed at XNLRB TnirD AA:uL
REPoRT (1939) 74.
105. In re Sterling Corset Co., Inc., 9 NLRB, No. 79 (1938).
106. In re Waggoner Co., 6 NLRB 731 (1938), NLRB Tnui" A:UA, Rxro-r,
(1939) 75.
107. NLRB T ma ANNUAL REPoRT (1939) 75, cases n. 38.
108. The defense of the employer that the employee "voluntarily quit" is not very
effective. In re Yale & Towne Mlfg. Co., 10 NLRB, No. 116 (1939). In 'Mount Vernon
Car Co., 11 NLRB, No. 46 (1939), the Board held that the action of employces in de-
manding the amount of their pay ordinarily held back in the case of current employees did
not constitute voluntary termination of employment, where prior to their action they had
been wrongfully refused employment.
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An important type of constructive discharge' °9 was defined by the
Board in In re Atlas Mills:110 "To condition employment upon the aban-
donment by the employees of the rights guaranteed them by the Act
is equivalent to discharging them outright for union activities." Perhaps
this is irrefutable as a principle of administration of the Act (assuming
"union activities" to be of the type the discouragement of which neces-
sarily discourages union membership) but the occasion for its enun-
ciation may not be the most opportune one possible.
Another type of discharge might more appropriately be tagged
"vicarious" than "constructive," since it may be explained tinder familiar
principles of the law of agency. The Board holds the employer responsi-
ble as for a discharge whenever the employment relation is terminated
against the will of the employee by action "attributable to" the en-
ployer.' 11 It is no defense for an employer to contend that the action
interrupting the employment was not taken by anyone with authority to
hire and fire, if such action was taken: pursuant to a closed shop con-
tract with a union assisted by any unfair labor practice; 112 by unor-
ganized employees purportedly refusing to work with members of an
outside union, if this attitude was encouraged by the employer;113 by
"bouncer squads" of inside union members, if adequate police protection
was available but was not sought by the employer; 11"4 or, in general, if
the employer knows of the occurrence and "does nothing to rectify the
situation.""' 5 Obviously the employer is vicariously liable for discharge
if he has delegated authority to anti-union agencies of any sort."10
109. Several other very important types of constructive discharge are discussed inira
p. 1177, in connection with the subject of "Content of 'failure to reinstate'", particularly
under the point of when a request for reinstatement is not necessary. Cf. discussion of
holding in In re Williams Coal Co., 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
110. 3 NLRB 10, 17 (1937). Each employee left after being asked "whether they
wanted to remain with the company or go out on strike." But a much more appropriate
occasion for the enunciation of such a principle was presented in In re Louisville Re-
fining Co., 4 NLRB 844 (1938). The Board held as a violation of § 8(3) the employer's
notification to the employee that he could not use him until he decided not to go out oni
strike if called upon by the organizer.
111. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 74.
112. In re The Grace Co., 7 NLRB 766 (1939), sumniariced in NLRB THm AN-
NUAL REPORT (1939) 74.
113. In re Clover Fork Coal Co., 4 NLRB 202, cnforccd in Clover Fork Coal Co. v.
N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
114. In re General Shoe Corp., 5 NLRB 1005 (1938).
115. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 74; see discussion "Discrimination by
nonfeasance", supra p. 1171.
116. In re Shellabarger Grain Products Corp., 8 NLRB 336 (1938); In re Fred-
erick R. Barrett, 3 NLRB 513 (1937). NLRB THIRD ANNUAL RErORT (1939) 69:
"Highway Trailer Company illustrates another method of discrimination. The employer
agreed to discharge any employee whom the company-dominated union deemed undesir-
able. A discharge pursuant to the direction of this union was found to be in violation
of the Section. The Board has reached the same result where the favored union, at-
[Vol. 48: 11521176
"DISCRIMINATION" UNDER N. L. R. A.
(3) Content of "failure to reinstate.""- A discriminatory rejection
of an application for reinstatement after a non-discriminatory lay-off or
a strike is, in the Board's view, obviously a violation of Section 8(3). If
that were the totality of the content of "failure to reinstate," a complete
analysis could be made by determining merely what constitutes an appli-
cation for reinstatement and what constitutes a rejection thereof. The
general rule, however, is not that "no infraction arises until the employee
induces employer action by making application for reinstatement," but
merely the much less inflexible rule that "ordinari, no infraction arises"
until application is made.1 8 For the Board holds that "under some cir-
cumstances an application for reinstatement is not prerequisite to finding
a refusal to reinstate in violation of Section 8(3)."'I Those circum-
stances also must be examined, therefore, because of their financial and
tactical importance.
An application for reinstatement may be made individually or col-
lectively,'2 and no particular formula need be used. The most that is
required in the way of form is, in some cases, that the request be "clear-
cut.' 2' But it may not be conditional.3 - Complications arise from the
Board's nice distinction that it may be "coupled with" but cannot be
itconditioned on" union demands, even if the demands go no further than
that the employer accord to the employees rights guaranteed them by
the Act. In re Fansteel Mlfetallurgical Corporation" clearly established
though not company-dominated, wmas assisted by other unfair labor practices, and where
the favored union wvas not otherwise assisted by unfair labor practices."
117. In connection with this type of employer conduct also the Board regards "dis-
crimination" as the basis of liability under the Section, and construes the Section to
give direct protection to all types of union "activities", regardless of whether or not
they are types of activity the restriction of which by the employer would necessarily
result in discouragement of union membership.
118. NLRB T]mr AxKxLAL REPORT (1939) 78.
119. Id. at 79.
120. In re Alabama Mills, Inc., 2 NLRB 20 (1936); cf. In re Williams Coal Co.,
11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939): "There is no evidence that any employees, other than these
(four), personally, through the U.M.W.A., or otherwvise, made or sought to male appli-
cation for reinstatement"; held, there was no refusal to reinstate.
121. In re Fansteel Corp., 5 NLRB 930 (1938), enforceinent denied on other grounds,
N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Corp., (1939) 6 U. S. L. NVWrm 896.
122. Strikers may not condition their application for reinstatement upon a demand
that the employer cease from committing, or remedy, unfair labor practices. The ration-
ale of this line of decisions is that if an employer engages in unfair labor practices, the
employees have their choice of protesting by a strike or seeking the remedy provided by
the Act, but they cannot expect to strike and also to get back pay under the Act. See
notes 136 and 137, infra. Cf. matter of Sunshine Co., 7 NLRB 1252 (1938).
123. The Board's decision in the Fansteel case, 5 NLRB 930, 945 (1938), stated the
Board's consistent doctrine on this point: "It might be argued that since the Union .-as
demanding as a condition to reinstatement only something to N hich they were entitled
under the Act-recognition and collective bargaining--the respondent in illegally refus-
ing this demand should be considered as discriminatorily refusing to reinstate the strikers.
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the proposition that an employer cannot be said to have refused rein-
statement to strikers so long as they were unwilling to return to work
under conditions existing at the time the strike was called, even though
the strikers were demanding as a condition of reinstatement only the
union recognition and collective bargaining to which they were entitled
under the Act. The Board feels so strongly that a conditional request
for reinstatement is no basis for a finding of violation of Section 8(3)
that in It re Hemp & Company,12 the Board conditioned its reinstate-
ment order in favor of employees found to have been discriminatorily
locked out, upon an application by them for reinstatement, although
ordinarily no such request is required of victims of discrimination, where
they had taken the position at the hearing that they would not accept an
offer of reinstatement unless the employer would recognize as their
bargaining representative the union which represented a majority of the
employees. However, in In re Black Diamond Steamship Corporation125
the union asked the employer to reinstate all strikers and to bargain with
the union (which had been certified by the Board as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative). The employer refused reinstatement and the
Board held that the refusal subsequent to the union's request constituted
a violation of Section 8(3) : "The respondent can find no refuge in the
fact that the application for reinstatement may have been coupled with
demands for collective bargaining."
The only other important requisite of an application is that it must be
timely. No discriminatory refusal to reinstate is found in cases where
the refusal occurs in response to a request made too early, that is, at a
time when the employer's plant has not resumed full capacity operations, 12 0
nor if the request is made too late,'12 after all positions have been filled
in a non-discriminatory manner upon termination of a strike.128 Once
the employee has induced employer action by a sufficient application for
reinstatement, the next element to be tested for sufficiency is the em-
ployer's response thereto. Of course, if the employee goes back to work,
the matter is settled. If, however, the employer makes what he contends
is an offer of reinstatement, but which the employee does not choose
We do not take this view. So long as the employees were unwilling to return to work
under the conditions existing at the time the strike was called, however just the grounds
on which their position was based, it cannot be said that the respondent was refusing to
reinstate them."
124. 9 NLRB, No. 41 (1938).
125. 3 NLRB 84, summarized at NLRB THIRD ANNuAL RXoRTr (1939) 79, order
enforced, Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936),
cert. denied, 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
126. See In re Phillips Packing Co., 5 NLRB 272, 282 (1938).
127. See In re Carrollton Metal Products Co., 6 NLRB 569, 586 (1938) (case of
Frank Morrell).
128. In re Sigmund Freisinger, 10 NLRB, No. 93 (1939).
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to accept, the offer must meet three tests established by the Board's
decisions before the Board will give it the effect of preventing the accrual
of back pay and the necessity of another offer of reinstatement. It must
be made in good faith; the employment offered must be "substantially
equivalent" to that held before the interruption by strike or lay-off;
and the offer may not be conditioned on the employee's giving up any
rights guaranteed by the Act.
Typical of an offer not made in good faith is that involved in I;t re
West Kentucky Coal Company12 9 wherein the employee was offered and
refused a job which would have been difficult for him to perform because
of his age. Numerous Board opinions define what is not "substantially
equivalent employment." Reinstatement of strikers "as if they were
newly employed" is not equivalent, since they are entitled to "their
seniority and other rights and privileges."' 30 Nor is it sufficient to offer
a job paying the same hourly wage as before the strike where an interim
general wage increase had been granted. 3' Reinstatement at a plant sixty
miles away from the place of the former employment "falls short of
substantially equivalent employment."' 32 Rather difficult to classify is the
deficiency found by the Board to exist in the offer of reinstatement made
by the employer during the hearing in In re General Shoe Corporation"ra
to outside union employees found by the Board to have been discrimina-
torily discharged in that they had been evicted from the plant by members
of an inside union. The Board held that the offer was not "an unquali-
fied offer" and therefore did not interrupt the running of back pay, since
it did not "guarantee them the full protection at their employment which
every employer normally owes to his employees." The third requirement
of a sufficient offer - that it be not conditioned on giving up rights under
the Act - is obvious, and what constitutes such a condition may best be
discussed in connection with the next following subject of when a request
for reinstatement is not necessary.
129. 10 NLRB, No. 10 (1939).
130. In re Western Felt Works, 10 NLRB, No. 31 (1938).
131. Ibid. If, however, no general interim wage increase has been granted, a refusal
to accept an offer of reinstatement because of dissatisfaction with a reduction in the
-wage scale just prior to the strike, precluded a finding of discriminatory refusal to
reinstate. See In re Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 837, 843 (1936) ; NLRB SEco::I
AwNUAL REPoRT (1938) 77.
132. In re Kuehne Mfg. Co., 7 NLRB 304 (1938). Apparently an offer of employ-
ment at one of the employer's plants only four miles distant is not equivalent, even
though it is exactly the same kind of work, where the employee concerned is a key figure
in the union's organizing campaign in the plant of his original employment. In re Ne-
koosa-Edwrards Paper Co., 11 NLRB, No. 42 (1939).
133. See note 114, supra. The Board explains elsewhere that "The offer of reinstate-
ment must be unequivocal, else the Board will not consider it bona fide." NLRB TrinD
ANNUAL REPoRT (1939) 80.
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The Board holds that an application for reinstatement is not prere-
quisite to finding a refusal to reinstate 34 in violation of Section 8(3),
for two widely divergent reasons: when an application is reasonably
believed to be unnecessary, and when it would reasonably be thought to
be futile. The first reason exists, for example, where the employer's
former policy has been to notify laid-off employees when they were to
resume work,"3 5 or where the employer has announced, in connection with
a lay-off, that the employees would be notified when to return.13 '
The question of -when the second reason for dispensing with the
necessity of an application for reinstatement exists is instilled with acute
financial interest. The Board's $200,000 back pay order in In re Carlisle
Lumber Company 37 arose out of such a situation. "Typically," the Board
explains, "the discriminatory action rendering an application unnecessary
is an offer of reinstatement by the employer based upon an unlawful
condition. . . . In several cases the unlawful condition of reinstate-
ment imposed by the employer provides for renunciation of an employer-
opposed union, the notorious 'yellow-dog' contract."13 The Carlisle
Lumber case'3 9 involved a situation wherein a strike had been called,
and the employer had notified all strikers that they were discharged,
before the effective date of the Act. About three weeks after the Act
became effective, the employer posted a notice stating that it would hire
on pre-strike terms all former employees who would sign application
cards. By the terms of the application cards, the signer agreed "to
renounce any and all affiliation with any labor organization." Most of
the union members made no application for reinstatement, but the Board
nevertheless found a discriminatory refusal to reinstate, reasoning that
they should not be penalized for not making an application which they
knew would be fruitless. Publishing the notice relieved the strikers "of
the necessity of making a formal application; nor is it an answer to
say that they were striking and would not have applied in any event:
that was for them to decide." The same reasoning applies in cases where
the employer requires as a condition of reemployment execution of in-
134. An application for reinstatement is never required for a finding of violation of
§ 8(3) in the case of discharges, including mass discharges or lock-outs. NLRB Src wml
ANNUAL REPORT (1938) 76 and cases n. 33 thereto; In re L. C. Smith and Corona Type-
writer Co., 11 NLRB, No. 123 (1939).
135. NLRB TIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 79; In re Waterman Steamship Corp,
7 NLRB 237 (1939).
136. In re North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, 10 NLRB, No. 113 (1930) ; It re
Western Felt Works, 10 NLRB, No. 108 (1939).
137. 2 NLRB 248 (1936), order enforced, N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F.
(2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938), further liltiated 99 F.
(2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied, (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEzu 914.
138. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939).80; see In re Western Felt Worws, 10
NLRB, No. 108 (1939).
139. See note 137, supra.
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dividual contracts in derogation of any rights guaranteed by the Act,
even though they do not forbid union membership.140 The Board has
held that requiring signature of contracts depriving employees of "the
right to demand recognition by the employer of any union" - tie original
Balleisen type of contract'- or depriving them of "right to demand
a closed shop or signed agreement by the employer with any union"'14
- the modified type of Balleisen contract - constitutes a violation of
Section 8(3).
Attaching to reinstatement the condition of joining a union favored
by the employer by means of a closed shop contract or otherwise, not
only relieves strikers of the necessity of applying for work, 43 but is
treated as a constructive discharge. 44 Blacklisting certain employees or
omitting them from lists approved for reemployment has the same result,
and if such action induced certain strikers to delay making applications
for reinstatement, the employer cannot rely upon a "first come, first
served" explanation to negative discrimination against union leaders. The
Board has the support of the Supreme Court on this. 45 Another situa-
140. In re Newark Rivet Works, 9 NLRB, No. 47 (1938); cf. In re Atlas Bag and
Burlap Co., 1 NLRB 292 (1936).
141. In re Atlas Bag and Burlap Co., 1 NLRB 292 (1936).
142. In re Federal Carton Corp., 5 NLRB 879 (1938). The same result follows if
the individual contracts required to be signed were purportedly the result of collective
negotiations between the employer and a union found to be employer-dominated within
§ 8(2). In re Newark Rivet Works, 9 NLRB, No. 47 (1938). Balleisen has played the
part of the "heavy" in many Board decisions, but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit refuses to let the Board order employers to cease using his services "for
the purposes of evading their obligations under the Act". N. L R. B. v. Hopwolod Re-
tinning Co., Inc., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). The order would seem to be
proper in view of its restriction as to purpose.
143. In re Jacob A. Hunkele, 7 NLRB 304 (1938) ; In re The Grace Co., 7 NLRB
766 (1939); NLRB TImD AxruAL. REPoRr (1939) 80. The Board refers to this as
the "erection of an illegal barrier against reemployment", and points out this relieves the
employees from the "necessity of making formal application for work." "Similarly,"
the Board adds, "an employer who violates Section 8(3) does not interrupt the continu-
ance of the unfair labor practice by making an offer of reinstatement . . . which is quali-
fied by the unlawful condition of their joining an employer-favored union. The Board
has held that failure to make application pursuant to such a discriminatory offer is im-
material; even though the employees might not have responded to an offer not so con-
ditioned."
144. The reasoning given in support of treating such conditions as constituting con-
structive discharge is most fully set forth in In re Williams Coal Co., 11 XLRB, No. 49
(1939) : "Such condition (a closed shop contract found not vithin the protection of the
proviso clause to Section 8(3) was imposed subsequent to the strike by the respondent.
Its imposition on June 16 was equivalent to a refusal by the respondent at that time of
an application by the striking employees to be reinstated for failure to conform to the
condition. It is immaterial that the employees in fact made no application for reinstate-
ment. Since the respondent at no time prior to June 16 terminated tile employment of
the employees on strike, its refusal (the constructive refusal) to reinstate was a dis-
charge of these employees."
145. See note 47, supra.
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tion regarded by the Board as rendering it futile for strikers to apply,
and hence relieving them of the necessity, is shown in a case wherein
the employer had delegated to an anti-outside-union committee authority
to decide which, if any, strikers should be reinstated, and the committee
had denied the applications of two strikers and indicated to the remainder
that applications would be useless. 146
(4) Discrimination by conduct not affecting hire or tenure. Matching
perspicacity against ingenuity, the Board has condemned as "discrimina-
tion in regard to . . . any term or condition of employment" several
varieties of conduct generally more subtle than that which affects hire
or tenure. A fine question arises as to just how trivial discrimination
as to conditions of employment must be before the Board will ignore it.
When the differentiation in treatment resulted merely in conditions being
"not so pleasant" as those previously enjoyed, the complaint was found
not to be sustained. Calling due money owed the employer by two em-
ployees who had gone on a sympathy strike was likewise insufficient.141
And when a pressman's foreman who knew of his union activities sup-
plied him with "short" rolls and kept his press rolling faster than those
tended by other employees, so that the union man either was not ready
with his rolls or "had to work hard" to keep up the pace, the Board
"considered that treatment to constitute discrimination of so minor a
nature as not to warrant a finding that the respondent discriminated
within the meaning of the Act."' 48
Coal mines seem to provide the best locales for anti-union employers
seeking to vent a little spleen against union members by making their
work difficult. In In re Harlan Fuel Company,149 union employees were
transferred to working rooms of "insufficient size," or else were not
supplied with "sufficient equipment," and thus prevented from earning
as much as they would have under normal working conditions. A thought-
ful employer in another case assigned union men to stations where they
would have to move so much rock and dirt that they would be working
from weeks to months with no compensation for coal produced.'" By
the same token, any transfer to set the stage for a future discharge or
lay-off of a particularly active union member on purported grounds of
inefficiency or low seniority in the new department, or to force him to
146. In re Shellabarger Grain Products Corp., 8 NLRB 336 (1938).
It is extremely difficult to predict the circumstances in which the Board will apply
its "futility of application" doctrine. See the opinion in In re Williams Coal Co., 11
NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
147. In re G. Sommers & Co., 5 NLRB 992 (1938).
148. In re A. S. Abell Co., 5 NLRB 644 (1938); cf. In re Matter of Washington
Mfg. Co., 4 NLRB 970 (1938).
149. 8 NLRB 25 (1938).
150. It, re Clover Fork Coal Co., 4 NLRB 202 (1937), order enforced, Clover Fork
Coal Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
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quit, will be considered discrimination."' But, to be discriminatory, a
transfer need not involve decreased wages or more difficult work. The
skilled mechanic is a proud man and does not take kindly to being removed
from responsibility. The Board's decisions recognize this.15 - Never-
theless, placing union men in less desirable jobs does not of itself establish
discrimination. Following a strike two union men were reinstated to
"less desirable" jobs, and the union complained of discrimination against
its members "in the time and manner of reinstating them." The Board
dismissed the complaint, declaring that its analysis of jobs held before
and after the strike showed that "within a reasonable time after the
strike two men had been given better jobs, five men were doing work
comparable to their pre-strike occupations, while only two men had less
desirable jobs.""' 3 Withholding a wage increase or other benefits from
employees who have not joined a favored union or signed individual
contracts purportedly negotiated by an employer-dominated labor organ-
ization is an obvious but surprisingly common type of discrimination.1 a
PERSONS PROTECTED 3Y SECTION 8 (3). The Section does not expressly
state who is within its protection. From use of the words "hire or tenure
of employment," however, the implication is clear that two great classes
of persons are protected: (1) applicants for employment, and (2) em-
ployees.
(1) The Board has explained that it is not essential to a finding of
an unfair practice under the Section that the status of employee be held
by the person against whom the discrimination has been directed, "for
the provision thereof has express application to a discrimination as to
hire. And where the charge of discrimination does relate to hire, the
fact that an employee status has not existed is wholly without probative
bearing on the issue whether an unlawful discrimination has occurred."25'
151. It re Pulasld Veneer Corp., 10 NLRB, No. 11 (1938) ; In rc Cincinnati Milling
Co., 9 NLRB, No. 40 (1938) (order withdrawn, Feb. 10, 1938); In re Nekoosa-Ed-
wards Paper Co., 11 NLRB, No. 42 (1939).
152. In it re Douglas Aircraft Co., 10 NLRB, No. 18 (1938), an employee vs found
to have been the victim of discrimination by virtue of a transfer which made no differ-
ence in his pay, but deprived him of responsibilities; in a case involving skilled em-
ployees of an electric utility company, the Board declared that "topmen" were humiliat-
ed by being put to work in the "poleyard", and being seen there by their fellow employees.
153. In re United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 10 NTLRB, No. 91
(1939).
154. In re Federal Carton Corp., 5 NLRB 879 (1938) (15 per cent w.ge increase);
In re 'Mt. Vernon Car Co., 11 NLRB, No. 46 (1939) (seniority provision disfavoring
employees who were not members of union on particular date). A coercively-imposed
check-off arrangement is held to constitute a discriminatory condition of employment.
In re Williams Coal Co., 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
155. In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 6 NLRB 325 (1938), consent decree of en-
forcemnent, 97 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938). The decision was also grounded on a
finding that the respondent has "assumed" the relationship of employer to the persons
concerned.
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In In re Montgomery Ward and Company,"0 the Board squarely held
that refusing employment, because of his union membership, to a person
who had never been employed by the company, constituted an unfair
practice within the Section. The rationale, according to the Board, is
that protection of prospective employees is necessary for the protection
of present employees, because anti-union discrimination against an appli-
cant is as effective a means for communicating to employees the em-
ployer's campaign against the union as discrimination against a present
employee." 7 As early as June, 1936, the Board was using the Section
as a basis for back pay orders in favor of one-time employees who had
been "discriminatorily" discharged (no labor dispute resulting)'" six
months prior to the effective date of the Act and who were found to
have been discriminatorily refused employment shortly after the Act
took effect.' The back pay was, of course, computed from the refusal
to employ. The "imaginary horrible" of sweeping back pay orders in
favor of applicants for employment who might be believed by the Board
to have been discriminatorily refused employment has never materialized,
however. In no case has the Board ordered back pay for an applicant
who had never been employed by the respondent employer or the pred-
ecessor in interest thereof. The remedy for such persons is placement
on a preferential employment list. 60
(2) Typically, the Board explains, discrimination is against an em-
ployee. Thus used, however, "employee" is a term of art, with poten-
tialities of inclusiveness far outrunning those of that much litigated
word in its general legal usage. In the first place, the Statute itself has
injected new content by declaring the inclusion of "any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice. ' " Secondly, the
Board seems likely to override the most pervasive limitation of the term.
Say "employee" to any lawyer and one of his first thoughts is "someone
not an independent contractor or employed by an independent contractor."
156. 4 NLRB 1151 (1938).
157. NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 73.
158. A labor dispute, if still "current", could have preserved their status as "em-
ployees" under the Act, even though it commenced prior to the effective date of the Act.
N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied,
304 U. S. 575 (1938).
159. In re National Casket Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 963 (1936). A former employee who
had voluntarily resigned is also within the protection of the Section and entitled to back
pay if discriminatorily refused employment. In re Cherry Cotton Mills, 4 NLRB 731
(1937), opinion withdrawn and reissued, 11 NLRB, No. 44 (1939).
160. It re Montgomery Ward and Co., 4 NLRB 1151 (1938).
161. Section 2(3). Most of the argument in the Fasted and related cases concerned
the effect of this definition. The Court declared in its opinion that there is abundant
opportunity for operation of this definition in situations similar to that of the Machay
case (a non-violent strike) "without construing it as countenancing lawlessness."
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Not so the Board. Taking a well-founded functional approach, the Board
has defined the term to include "all employees in the conventional as well as
legal sense," declaring that "the primary consideration is whether effectua-
tion of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehends securing
to the individual the rights guaranteed and the protection afforded by
the Act"' 1 2 The significance of the definition lies in the fact that from
it the Board reasons that contracts, although carefully framed to create
the status of independent contractor, are not conclusive, since "public
interest in the administration of the Act permits an inquiry into the
material facts and substance of the relationslip."'I a Thus the Board
has laid the basis for bringing within the protection of Section 8(3)
many classes of persons ordinarily considered as independent contractors
but who, for practical purposes, are economic dependents of the respond-
ent employer.
All classes of employees are within the protection of the Section
regardless of their managerial or supervisory statusc a or high wages
or salaries. 65 Employees erroneously supposed by the employer to be
union members or active in a union have been protected by the Board
in many cases. An opinion explains: "that the respondent was mistaken
and selected the wrong man makes the discharge no less a discrimina-
tion."' 66 Unaffiliated employees who are relatives of active union mem-
bers are entitled to relief under the Section if their discharges were even
162. It re Seattle Post-Intelligencer Dep't, 9 NLRB, No. 119 (1938). Although this
was a representation case under §9(c), the Board later applied the doctrine in a com-
plaint case. In re Interstate Granite Corp., 11 NLRB, No. 89 (1939). The definition
has also been approved and applied again in a more recent representation case, In re
Connor Land and Lumber Co., 11 NLRB, No. 58 (1939).
163. Ibid.
164. NLRB Tinnm ANNUAL REPoRT (1939) 67. "The Board has found the employ-
er's anti-union discrimination an unfair labor practice, regardless of the status of the
employee. In in re Fruehauf Trailer Company, [1 NLRB 68 (1935), order enforced,
N. L. R. B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937)] the Board found that an
unfair labor practice had occurred with respect to a subforeman who had been discharged
for union activity. A similar result was readied involving a foreman, newspaper circu-
lation district and branch managers, and a power house chief engineer." See also In re
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 7 NLRB 1189 (1938). Contra: In re Kuehne Mfg. Co.,
7 NLRB 304 (1938). However, in N. L. R. B. v. iles Coleman Lumber Co., 95 F. (2d)
197 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); id., 98 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), the company contested
the Board's power to order reinstatement of non-union workers who had gone on the
strike, particularly two foremen, and the court specifically held that §§ 10(c) and 2(3)
conferred such power on the Board.
165. In In re Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, et al., 7 NLRB 662 (1938), a repre-
sentation case, the Board rejected the argument that the Act was intended to protect
only wage earners in the lower income brackets and hence does not apply to creative
and professional workers paid as much as IZ9,000 a week.
166. In re Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 9 NLRB, No. 99 (1938), and see NLRB Tnine
ANNUAL REPoRT (1939) 76 and cases, n. 76.
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"indirectly" caused by discrimination against union members. 0 7 Former
members of defunct unions are held to be protected by the Section.10 8
And prospective members of potential unions are accorded the same pro-
tection."0 9 The nearest the Board has ever come to recognizing that the
Section protects purely non-union employees who have never struck or
even been suspected of membership or collective activities is the state-
ment in the Third Annual Report that "the employer's anti-union discrim-
ination has on occasions been directed even to those not suspected of
union activity."' 70 The only case cited, however, is In re National Motor
Bearing Company,'7' and although that is cautiously preceded by a cf.
signal, the Report does not add that the non-union employees affected by
the discrimination were accorded no remedy by the Board's Decision and
Order.
Strikers (whether union members or not) are broadly protected by
Section 8(3) in accordance with the Board's unequivocal rationale that
the Act "imposes on employers the same duty not to discriminate in
regard to strikers as exists with respect to employees still working and
not participating in the strike."' 72 Potential strikers also are protected 7
and strikers who refuse an offer to return to work during a strike.1' 4
Sit-down strikers and those who aid them are, of course, no longer
within the protection of the Act since the Fansteel decision. Probably
excluded also by that decision are participants in any "unlawful" strike. 3
And the Sands caie strips the protection from any employee who "re-
167. In re Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 3 NLRB 26 (1937), order enforeed, Iem-
phis Furniture Co. v. N. L. R. B., 96 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); In re Mans-
field Mills, 3 NLRB 901 (1937); ef. it re Fashion Piece Dye Works, 6 NLRB 274
(1938) (discharge of non-union employee held discriminatory, within §8(3), where
employer alleged as reason fear that he would commit sabotage because his brother, an
active union member, had been discharged).
168. In re Appalachian Electric Power Co., 3 NLRB 240 (1937), enjorcenent denied
on other grounds, Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 93 F. (2d) 985 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1938).
169. In re Stehli & Co., 11 NLRB, No. 124 (1934); see NLRB Tuuw ANNUAL
REPORT (1939) 68.
170. NLRB THaiRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 67.
171. Discussed supra p. 1170.
172. In re Shellabarger Grain Products Corp., 8 NLRB 336 (1938). In the case
of a non-violent strike, this view is strongly supported by the Supreme Court's opinion
in the Mackay case. Removal of watchmen from their duties during a strike because
they were too sympathetic with the strikers' cause was held by the Board not to consti-
tute an unfair practice within § 8(3). In re United States Stamping Co., 5 NLRB 172
(1938).
173. In re Louisville Refining Co., 4 NLRB 844 (1938).
174. "To permit the employer to discriminate against strikers when they apply for
reinstatement merely because they bad previously refused an offer to work, is, of course,
a deliberate rebuke to concerted action by members of a labor organization." See In re
Sunshine Hosiery Co., 1 NLRB 664, 673 (1936).
175. See (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEx 896, 899.
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pudiates his agreement."' 1 0 The scope of this exclusion is presently
unpredictable, since the Sands case, although it involved a collective agree-
ment, may prove to be an even greater incentive to the multiplication
of "contracts" of a subtly anti-union nature than the case of Hichman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell'77 was to multiplication of blatant yellov,-
dog contracts. 7
8
PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR DISCRIMINATION. Familiar problems
of application of the doctrine of respondeat superior and "disregard"
of corporate entities take on no special color under the Act. They con-
stantly arise, however, particularly in connection with allegedly unauthor-
ized action by foremen and other supervisory employees.'"" One of the
Board's most continuously repeated principles is that action by super-
visors, with whom the employees are in closest contact and to whom they
look for indication of the employer's attitude, is of far greater significance
in determining unfair labor practices than the words of high officials?"8
Of course, if the Supreme Court actually meant what Justice Roberts
seems to have said in the Sands case"' - that a plant superintendent
does not "hold such a position that his statements are evidence of the
company's policy" -then the Board's entire doctrine on this point has
been shattered to bits by the Court's quiet dynamite. If those words were
intended, typical future evidence of a company's anti-union bias will
be found only in formal resolutions condemning unions, duly passed by
the board of directors.
DEFENSES TO COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATION. Far and away the
most frequent defense to complaints of discrimination is denial by the
176. See (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEr 889, 896. At the same time the Court was making
this breach of contract ruling, the Board was announcing that an employer's breach of a
collective bargaining contract was not an unfair labor practice, although the contract had
been made with a majority union. In re Williams Coal Co., 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
177. 245 U. S. 229 (1917) ; a case so universally criticized that it greatly accelerated
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
178. See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Infliuence Upon the Dcelopment of
Collective Bargaining (1937) 50 HAv. L. REv. 1071, 10S4n (iting LANmIS, CAsEs O:
LAmoR LAw (1934) 131n., 181-182, and SEmux, THE YELWw-DoG Coz=AcT (1932) 21
et seq.).
179. Most of the common types of this problem are mentioned in connection with
"vicarious" discharges.
180. In re Tennessee Copper Co., 9 NLRB, No. 19 (193S) (Board's most explicit
statement); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 11 NLRB, No. 54 (1939). The Board is
rather generally sustained by the courts in this attitude. For example: N. I. R. B. V.
A. S. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 4ti, 1938) (violation of §8(1)); Virginia
Ferry Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 101 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 4ti, 1939) (violation of §8(2)).
A notable reversal is Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co. v. N. L. R. B., 93 F. (2d)
411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied, (1939) 6 U. S. I. WVEE 442, wherein the court
declared the emphasis must be on the conduct of high company officials, and brushed
aside as not attributable to the employer the discriminatory remarks of supervisors of
high rank.
181. See (1939) 6 U. S. L. ,VEEr 888-89, 896.
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employer that differentiation in treatment was because of union mem-
bership or activities. Ordinarily this is done by alleging that sufficient
cause motivated the action complained of. This sometimes raises one
question of law (the legal sufficiency of the alleged cause), but it always
raises (unless they are admitted) two questions of fact: the existence
of the alleged cause; and the efficiency of the motivation, granted the
sufficiency and existence of the alleged cause.
Naturally most cases turn upon the factual determinations-that is, the
weighing of the evidence' 2 - since in most cases the employer is able
to allege causes the legal sufficiency of which is beyond cavil. However,
it would nevertheless be highly unrealistic to dismiss the question of
sufficiency with the mere statement, even though it be made by the Su-
preme Court, that "the Act permits a discharge for any reason other than
union activity or agitation for collective bargaining."'' 8 Enough has
been said herein in connection with the question of whether and what
union "activities" are directly protected by Section 8(3) and the dis-
cussion of employers' problems of discipline18 4 to show that there are
many things which theoretically might constitute sufficient cause for dis-
charge or refusal to reinstate but which the Board as a practical matter
does not recognize as such. Thus the ruling of law- sufficiency of an
alleged cause - often masquerades as a determination of fact. Further-
more, although proving the existence of proper cause, or even partial
motivation thereby, does not, as has been shown herein,' establish the
defense of absence of anti-union motive required by the Board, the
allegation of proper cause is, for all practical purposes, the sine qua non
of an effective defense. For no employer has yet appeared hardy enough
-or foolhardy enough -to rest on the "sheer caprice" defense so often
talked of by the Board. 6 A summary is justified, therefore, first, of
those defences which most often find favor with the Board, and, secondly,
of those which do not. Defenses to reinstatement of strikers who have
engaged in violence have been separately considered.18 7
Causes which may constitute justification. "Perhaps the most common
explanations offered in defense," the Board declares, "are that the em-
182. For a discussion of this problem, see Ward, Proof of Discrimination under the
National Labor Relations Act (May, 1939) 7 GEo. WASH. L. Rav.
183. Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103 (1937); see also the 'niisleel
opinion, (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEsK 896, 899, wherein the Court paraphrases thi, state-
ment in the Associated Press case into ". . . the employer is not permitted to discharge
his employees because of union activity or agitation for collective bargaining." The
Court is referring, however, to the purpose of the definition of "employee" in §2(3),
and no reference is made to § 8(3).
184. See supra pp. 1164 et seq.
185. See infra p. 1191.
186. See NLRB FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1936) 77; NLRB SECOND ANNUAL RE-
PORT (1937) 70; NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 65.
187. See supra pp. 1158-1159.
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ployee is inefficient, or that a drop in production required a reduction
in personnel which was accomplished pursuant to criteria not anti-union
in character."'88 The Board always accepts either of these as justifica-
tion if proved the true cause. Even an unjustified suspicion of inefficiency,
if the suspicion actually exists, 89 or very minor instances of inefficiency, 113
will be sufficient. Other common causes which will generally be accepted
as justification, if proved, include: general insubordination, as where
employee profanely told the plant superintendent that the company had
had control long enough and that from then on the union was going to
tell them how to run the place;191 refusal to obey orders;202 misconduct
or dangerous misconduct ;193 excessive absences from work ;"O4 irresponsi-
bility; 9 frequent disputes with other employees;"'0 disputes with super-
visors and complaints of not being able to do heavy work;'07 strong
suspicion of dishonesty;"9s physical incapacity for work;'3 lack of seni-
ority, or former sporadic employment ;200 lack of raw material -2" change
to new machinery which employees discharged were not shown to have
been capable of operating;-02 poor financial condition necessitating re-
188. These defenses may be appropriate in cases of lay-offs, discharges, individual
or mass, or refusals to reinstate. Closed shop contracts as justifications are discussed
infra p. 1192. NLRB THmD AN.NUAL REPor (1939) 84; In re Newport News Ship-
building & Drydock Co., 8 NLRB, No. 107 (1938) (general lay-off constituted justifica-
tion despite "highly suspicious" background of violations of §§ 8(1) and 8(2)).
189. in re Seagrave Corp., 4 NLRB 1093 (1938); NLRB Tumui A:u.v,L RZroar
(1939) 85.
190. In re General Chemical Co., 8 NLRB, No. 31 (1938) (discharge occurred at end
of busy season, the selection being based on minor instances of inefficiency, which, how-
ever, made discharged union employee's record worse than those of employees retained).
191. In re Mock-Judson-Voehringer Co., 8 NLRB, No. 16 (1938); In re Wolfenden,
12 NLRB, No. 20 (1939) (cursing employer) .
192. In re Empire Furniture Corp., 10 NLRB, No. 92 (1939); In re Triplett Electric
Co., 5 NLRB 835 (1938) ; cf. In re Julius Breckwoldt, 9 NLRB, No. 17 (1933).
193. In re A. H. Wirz, Inc., 9 NLRB, No. 43 (1938) ; In re Suron Optical Co., Inc.,
11 NLRB, No. 65 (1939) (despite "considerable suspicion" of employer's motive) ; In re
Panco-Panther Rubber Co., 11 NLRB, No. 117 (1939) ("fooling round" vth girls
working on dangerous machine).
194. Held "ample justification for a discharge" of an outstanding union leader. In re
Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 11 NLRB, No. 18 (1939); In re Yates-American Machinery
Co., 7 NLRB 627 (1938) ; In re Triplett Electrical Co., 5 NLRB 835 (193) ; cf. In re
Julius Breckwoldt, 9 NLRB, No. 17 (1938) (discharge of union president for leaving
shop to talk to other employees while they were working).
195. In re Cardinale Trucking Corp., 5 NLRB 220 (1938).
196. In re Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8 NLRB, No. 107 (193S).
197. In re North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, 10 NLRB, No. 113 (1939).
198. In re Wald Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., 3 NLRB 712 (1937).
199. In re Shellabarger Grain Products Corp., 8 NLRB, No. 33 (1933).
200. In re Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 9 NLRB, No. 99 (1938) (despite general anti-
union bias of employer).
201. In re North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, 10 NLRB, No. 113 (1939).
202. In re Uxbridge Worsted Co., 11 NLRB, No. 31 (1939).
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moval of plant to another city after impasse in collective bargaining ;211
walk-out of essential workers, necessitating shut-down of department ;214
hiring of new employees during strike not caused by unfair labor prac-
tices ;205 bona fide dispute as to interpretation of strike-settlement agree-
ment with union ;206 bona fide construction of seniority agreement ;207 and
"honest misunderstanding" that employee had secured other employ-
ment.20 8  The most consistently successful defense is abolition of or
discontinuance of the job formerly held, if coupled with a showing that
no replacement employees have been employed. The Board. accepts this
as justification even from employers having a conspicuous anti-union
background °.20  Another sure-fire defense, although a comparatively new
one, is failure of an employee to earn, at piece rates, the minimum wage
paid at the plant. 10
Causes usually held no justification. No doctrine of private necessity
creating even an incomplete conditional privilege is recognized by the
Board in discrimination cases.21'
Nor does "freedom of the press" confer privilege on press associations
or newspapers to discriminate among editorial employees because of
union membership. The Board and the Supreme Court both rejected an
employer's contention that freedom to discriminate was a necessity of
the business of news gathering.212 Another alleged business justification
uniformly rejected by the Board is the contention that the other employees
refuse to work with the discharged employee ;213 and the same attitude
203. In re Lengel-Pencil Co., 8 NLRB, No. 122 (1938). The most conservative
court would find no opening to criticize the Board's handling of the evidence in this
case. A lockout of the employees, repeated threats of liquidation of the business and of
removal of the plant, and the final removal of the plant to another city were found
not to constitute discrimination to discourage union activities or collective bargaining.
The Board found that the threats were motivated by the financial condition of the enm-
ployer and that the removal of the plant resulted from an impasse in collective bar-
gaining.
204. In re Julius Breck-oldt, 9 NLRB, No. 17 (1938).
205. Ibid.
206. In re Elkland Leather Co., 8 NLRB, No. 56 (1938).
207. In re Minneapolis-Moline Power Co., 8 NLRB, No. 82 (1938).
208. In re Ferguson Bros. Mfg. Co., 9 NLRB, No. 30 (1938).
209. In re Mt. Vernon Car Co., 11 NLRB, No. 46 (1939); In re Acnme Air Applianice
Co., 10 NLRB, No. 123 (1939). Citations for this proposition could be multiplied at
great length. But cf. In re Patriarca Store Fixtures, Inc., 12 NLRB, No. 11 (1939).
210. In re Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 10 NLRB, No. 116 (1939). See also In re
Pulaski Veneer Corp., 10 NLRB, No. 11 (1938); In re Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 7
NLRB 714 (1938); In re Marathon Rubber Products Corp., 10 NLRB, No. 59 (1938)
(involving more colorful reasons for discharge).
211. In re Star Publishing Co., 4 NLRB 498 (1937), order eftorced, N. L. R. B, v.
Star .Publishing Co., 97 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
212. Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103 (1937).
213. It re Clover Fork Coal Co., 4 NLRB 202 (1937), order enforced, Clover Fork
Coal Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; In re General Shoe Corp,
5 NLRB 1005 (1938) ; It. re Trawler Mars Stella, Inc., 12 NLRB, No. 50 (1939).
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is maintained even though the reason given for the refusal is allegedly
unconnected with the union membership or activities of the employee.2a4
Business reasons of one sort or another are generally the justification
alleged for shutting down the plant where a "mass discharge" is alleged
by the Board's complaint. The employer's claimed fear that a "sit-
down" strike may occur has never been accepted by the Board as an
excuse.215 Similar treatment has been accorded the employer's contention
that the plant was closed because labor trouble had influenced the mental
attitude of the employees and caused them to produce inferior goods,
resulting in many returns and complaints. 10 Calling a strike, or a partial
strike, or managing a non-violent sit-down strike,2 17 has not heretofore
been considered by the Board as a justifiable basis for differentiation in
treatment of the employees who did so. The employee's conduct as an
individual, as well as his conduct as a union member, frequently is the
basis for justification. But his insubordination is never regarded as an
excuse if it were provoked by the employer. 18 And the use of profane
or indecent language, even by a woman employee, will not constitute
justification where such language is not uncommon,2 1 although the Board
hastened to declare that such holdings are not intended to impinge on
the employer's right to make rules against use of such language.2
Refusal to work on an extra shift out of regular turn will not be recog-
nized as a basis for discharge where no written rules governed the
subject and the employees believed that they had a right to refuse; -'
nor will a refusal to work on Saturday in violation of a union rule be
214. In re Nekoosa-Edw\ards Paper Co., 11 NLRB, No. 42 (1939). The Board flatly
refused to believe the stipulated testimony of 50 employees that they would refuse to
work with the discharged employee because he had complained to the company, in
their opinion unfairly, against the plant superintendent.
215. E.g., it re National Motor Bearing Co., 5 NLRB 409 (193); Hopwood Re-
tinning Co., 4 NLRB 922 (1938), order enforced aith minor inodjikcalions, X. L. R. B.
v. Hopwood Retinning Co., Inc., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); In ro Patriarca
Store Fixtures, Inc., 12 NLRB, No. 11 (1939).
216. It re Somerset Shoe Co., 5 NLRB 486 (1938) ; In re Phillips Granite Co., 11
NLRB, No. 72 (1939).
217. In re Harnischfeger Corp., 9 NLRB, No. 64 (1938).
218. Employer refused grievance committeeman use of phone to inform union official
of result of conference, and thus "provoked" employee into leaving building to telephone.
Employee "properly took a few minutes off from work to confer with" the union official.
In re Art Crayon Co., Inc., 7 NLRB 102 (1938).
219. "A factory iwash room is not a place where decorum in the use of language is
commonly observed, and from the obscenities used by other witnesses testifying at the
Hearing, we are satisfied that the words attributed to Mrs. Keady did not create the
furore which the respondent's witnesses, calmly repeating her words in open court,
would have us believe." In re Federal Bearings Co., Inc., 4 NLRB 467, 46S (1937).
220. In re Titmus Optical Co., 9 NLRB, No. 94 (1938): "An employer has a right
to discharge an employee for using obscene language in his plant if he sees fit to do
so," but such alleged reason is found to have been a pretest under the circumstances.
221. In re Dunbar Glass Corp., 6 NLRB 789 (193S).
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regarded as justification where the employer did not usually operate its
plant on Saturdays, or a refusal to work on Labor Day, in order to
attend a union rally, although local custom was to work on that day and
employer gave warning in advance of discharge of all who failed to
report.222 The employer's fear that an employee "might commit sabotage"
because his brother had been discharged was denied sufficiency as a
defense.23
THE CLOSED SHOP PROVISO: A SPECIAL DEFENSE UNDER SECTION 8(3).
The proviso clause to Section 8(3)224 establishes a special defense to
complaints of discriminatory discharge by creating a privilege in the
employer to act pursuant to a contract which comes within the pro-
tection of that clause. This special defense, therefore, is always dependent
upon whether the contract relied upon meets the strict requirements of
the proviso. Two clauses of the proviso narrowly restrict (1) the type
of contracts protected and (2) the type of labor organization which may
be a party thereto.
(1) Strictly construed -and provisos should be strictly construed-
the closed shop clause protects from the several proscriptions of Section
8 (subsections (1), (2), and (3)) only the closed shop or all-union
shop provisions of contracts made with a proper labor organization
party. Nothing more than that, and nothing less225 than that, is pro-
tected by the words of the proviso: "an agreement with a labor organ-
ization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership
therein." Thus, a check-off agreement is not within the language of
the proviso whether or not contained in the same contract with a valid
closed shop agreement. The Board has not yet decided the question
of whether a check-off agreement is protected by implication of the
proviso.226 It generally proceeds, however, by assuming that the proviso
would protect a check-off agreement if made with a proper labor organ-
ization party.227 But the Board has emphatically held that a check-off
agreement not protected by the proviso is a violation of Section 8(1),
(2), and (3).228 As to Section 8(3), the performance by the employer
of the agreement imposes a "condition" of employment "obviously dis-
criminatory in favor of" the contractee union.220
222. In re Hyman Levy, 11 NLRB, No. 80 (1939); In re Good Coal Co., 12 NLRBl,
No. 19 (1939).
223. In re Fashion Piece Dye Works, Inc., 6 NLRB 274 (1938).
224. The proviso clause is set out in note 65, supra.
225. See In re Clinton Cotton Mills, 1 NLRB 97, 110 (1935).
226. See In re National Electric Products Corp., 3 NLRB 475, 486n (1937).
227. In re Williams Coal Co., 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939) ; cf. National Electric Pro-
ducts Corp., 3 NLRB 475 (1937) (agreement to check-off dues whether or not em-
ployee checked was a member of the contractee union).
228. In re Williams Coal Co., 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
229. In re National Electric Products Corp., 3 NLRB 475, 486 (1937).
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The problem of whether the proviso would protect a preferential shop
contract is also a delicate one. Strictly construed, the proviso would
afford no protection for this type of agreement, since a preferential shop
provision does not require membership in the contractee union as a
condition of employment, but merely gives members of the contractee
union preference in hiring when vacancies exist and members are avail-
able to fill them. The circuit court of appeals held a preferential contract
to be within the protection of the proviso and valid and binding on the
employer in Peninsula & Occidental Steamship Company v. National
Labor Relations Board."° There was no discussion therein of the instant
problem, however. The implication of protection seems less strained
in the case of preferential agreements than in relation to the check-off,
but the argument that the greater includes the lesser lost much of its
force by reason of the Board's explanation in the Clinton Cotton Mills
case23 of the function of the proviso. In any event, the Board has
held, a preferential shop contract is no defense to discharges because such
contracts do not require the discharge of employees, but only the granting
of preference in filling vacancies. 3 - Thus the problem under discussion
can arise only in connection with alleged discrimination in regard to hire,
and has no bearing on tenure or discharges.
(2) The first requirement of a proper labor organization party to a
closed shop contract is contained in the "parenthetical clause," which
requires that the labor organization be "(not established, maintained,
or assisted by any action defined in this act as an unfair labor practice)"
(italics supplied). The emphasized language is the condition which pre-
vents the doctrine of the Supreme Court in the Consolidated Edison
case'3 from applying to closed shop contracts. Under the rule of that
case it appears that the Board must make a finding of violation of Sec-
tion 8(2) before it can set aside as violative of the Act a "beneficial"
contract not containing a closed shop clause. Apparently for reasons
of policy, the Board has never yet found a violation of Section 8(2) in
connection with a nationally-affiliated union, although the same type of
employer-conduct has many times existed with respect to which the
Board would have made such a finding in connection with an unaffiliated
union." 4 But no such finding of company domination need be made in
230. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L R. B., 9S F. (2d) 411, 414 (C. C. A.
5th, 1938); followed it; Waterman Steamship Corp. v. N. L. ML B., 4 L R. IL 276
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
231. In re Clinton Cotton Mills, 1 NLRB 97 (1935).
232. In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 7 NLRB 237 (1938). A contract giving the
union the right to make selections for discharge is treated as a dosed-shop contract
rather than a preferential contract. In re Highway Trailer Co., 3 NLRB 591, 609 (1937).
233. See note 33, siupra.
234.- The facts showed a clear violation of § 8(2) in In re Consolidatcd Edison case,
(1938) 6 U. S. L. ,Vnrn 425, and in the In re National Elcetric Products Corp. case,
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the case of a closed shop contract, if the contractee union has been
assisted by employer conduct in violation of Section 8(1) or (3). Thus
several months after the Consolidated Edison decision, the Board with
justifiable confidence proceeded to declare void a closed shop contract
between a large employer and an A. F. of L. union.23' 5 Obviously a closed
shop contract is void if there is a proper finding of violation of Section
8(2) .23' The proviso does not apply although the acts of assistance by
the employer occurred before the effective date of the Act. 31 Such acts
could not, of course, be regarded retroactively as constituting unfair
labor practices, but the conduct is nevertheless "defined as" an unfair
practice by the Act.
The second requirement of a proper labor organization party is con-
tained in the conditional clause, "if such labor organization is the repre-
sentative of the employees as provided in Section 9(a), in the appro-
priate bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made." Section
9(a) is the famous majority rule provision, so all of the familiar prob-
lems of majority representation are thus introduced into the closed shop
proviso. These include definition of the appropriate bargaining unit,
including the constituency thereof, and proof of majority, including a
particular time element. The first problem, then, is whether the agree-
ment covers an appropriate unit, which must be determined by the
Board under the principles laid down in Section 9(b) - a special subject
having its own extensive body of case law. The constituency of the unit,
however, has a special relation to the subject of the closed shop contract
as a defense to an alleged violation of Section 8(3). In the case of a
strike, the Board holds, the unit includes employees on strike as well as
those who have returned to work, and the contractee union must represent
an uncoerced majority of both counted together. 38 This is fair enough;
the difficult problem will arise where substantially all of the original
employees are on a strike not caused by any unfair labor practice, and
the employer has hired a full crew of replacements. This presents three
possibilities for the unit: the replacement employees; replacement em-
3 NLRB 475 (1937), but the Board "found" no violation. In the It re Mt. Vernon Car
Mfg. Co. case, 11 NLRB, No. 46, (1939), no violation of § 8(2) was charged in the
complaint, but it would have been charged if the union concerned was not nationally-
affiliated. Here again, as in the case of § 8(3), the Board does not enforce the Statute
as it is written.
235. In re Mt. Vernon Car Mfg. Co., 11 NLRB, No. 46 (1939).
236. The Board's original definitive consideration of the proviso arose in this con-
nection in In re Clinton Cotton Mills, 1 NLRB 97 (1935). Very little substantive inter-
pretation had been added by the Board until the it re Williamns Coal Co. case, 11 NLRB,
No. 49 (1939) ; In re United Fruit Co., 12 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
237. In re Clinton Cotton Mills, 1 NLRB 97 (1935); it re Williams Coal Co., 11
NLRB, No. 49 (1939). "Otherwise an employer could perpetuate an organization of
his creation prior to July 5, 1935." NLRB T~ian A N AL REPoRT (1938) 90.
238. i re Williams Coal Co., 11 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
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ployees plus the strikers; and the strikers alone. For purposes of repre-
sentation, the Board has adopted the third possibility, holding that the
replacement employees are not entitled to vote in an election conducted
under Section 9(c)." Consistency would require the same holding in
connection with a closed shop contract, since the problem is identical-
are the replacement employees entitled to representation, or can they be
held to have no rights under the Act merely because they are replace-
ments, and even though the strike was not caused by any unfair labor
practice. The Board's answer seems harsh; furthermore, the Supreme
Court has declared that the employer has an unqualified right to hire
replacement employees in the case of a strike not caused by unfair labor
practices, and that they need not be displaced to reinstate the strikers. -40
The requirement of proof of a majority is not to be met by merely
showing majority membership in the contractee union, or a majority
designation thereof.24' The majority must be an "uncoerced majority,"
and is "vitiated" if there has been interference by the employer in assist-
ing the contractee union.- 2 A truly subtle employer who wished to fore-
stall a closed shop demand by a strong union might naively render the
union some rather obvious but not particularly efficacious assistance, and
then regretfully proclaim that he had been advised by counsel that he
was precluded from entering such a contract, as his enforcement of it
would constitute discrimination under the Act, since it would not be
protected by the proviso.
The time when the majority must exist is rather clearly stated in the
words of the proviso - "when (the agreement was) made." This ques-
tion arises frequently, and the Board's answer is taken directly from the
statutory words.
43
Great difficulty is inherent in the question presented to the Board by
a change in affiliation of a majority of the members of a union having
an existing closed shop contract. 2" In the cases so far decided, the courts
have been willing to apply the proviso in a number of cases wherein the
239. It re A. Sartorious, 10 NLRB, No. 37 and No. 37a (1933).
240. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1933).
241. E.g., In re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 8 NLRB 112 (1933) (contract signed
by 964 out of 1,032 employees); In re Aissouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, 7 NLRB 186
(1938) ; In re Serrick Corp., 8 NLRB 621 (1938). The requirement is met by a showing
that a majority of the employees went on a strike conducted by the contractee Union.
In re United Fruit Co., 12 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
242. Cases cited mpra note 327; In re National Electric Products Corp., 3 NLRB
475 (1937).
243. In re Merry Shoe Co., 10 NLRB, No. 32 (1938), order %ftihdrazn uithout ex-
planation, Jan. 27, 1939.
244. It re M & Mf Woodwordng Co., 6 NLRB 372 (1938), order rcved, M & M.1
Woodworklng Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 L. R. R. 36 (C. C. A. 9th, Feb. 17, 1933); In re
Smith Wood Products, Inc., 7 NLRB 950 (1938). For a comprehensive discussion see
(1939) 48 Y.L L. 3. 1053.
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Board had found it to be no defense.241 In at least one case, however,
the Board was willing to hold that the proviso applied, although the
circumstances concerning the ready concession of a closed shop were
"somewhat suspicious," where the contract was signed by the employer
after check of the majority status of the union, and upon the union's
insistence.2 14  The Board has set up one rather mysterious and extra-
statutory but not unfair condition to reliance upon the proviso: employees
must have notice and full information concerning the closed shop agree-
ment, so that they may distinguish between unlawful acts of the employer
and action taken pursuant to a legal labor organization contract.
"2 7
MISCELLANEOUS AND TECHNICAL DEFENSES. A showing by "reliable
evidence" of compliance with the trial examiner's recommendations as to
employees found by him to have been discriminatorily discharged has
been held sufficient basis for dismissal of the complaint as to those per-
sons.2 1 ' Dissolution of a corporate employer prior to enforcement of
the Board's order is not regarded as a defense if there is a successor
corporation.2 49 A much more difficult problem is presented where the
employer goes out of business entirely, and has no successor, or goes into
a different line of business. The Board declared itself "unable" to order
an employer whose unfair labor practices had caused a strike to reinstate
the striking employees, where during pendency of the strike he had gone
into a different line of business requiring a different type of labor.-"
The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata undoubtedly will apply in a proper
case under the Act, but it has no application, the Board has held, where
the former case was dismissed before hearing on the merits, although
the charges were withdrawn with the consent of the Board's regional
director.25 It is no defense that employees discriminatorily discharged
have failed to act in mitigation of damages,' 25 nor that they refused an
245. N. L. R. B. v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938); Peninsular
& Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. dcn ed,
59 Sup. Ct. 248 (1938); M & M Woodworking Co. v. N. L. R. B., 6 NLRB 372 (1938).
246. In re United Fruit Co., 12 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
247. See It re Electric Vacuum Cleaner Corp., 8 NLRB 112 (1938) ; cf. In re United
Fruit Lines, Inc., 12 NLRB, No. 49 (1939).
248. lIn re Serrick Corp., 8 NLRB 621 (1938).
249. In re The Timken Silent Automatic Corp., 11 NLRP,, No. 71 (1939).
250. it re N. Kiamie, 4 NLRB 808 (1938); and in It re Shell Petroleum Corp,,
10 NLRB, No. 60 (1938), the Board held that reinstatement of employees found to have
been discriminatorily discharged would not be necessary, in view of a fire which had
destroyed the plant at which they were employed, if the employment of persons hired
to replace the discharged employees ceased permanently as a result of such fire. The
Board provided, however, that if the replacement employees were retained after the
fire or after an interval were reinstated elsewhere by the employer, the reinstatement of
the discharged employees should not be denied.
251. In re Shuron Optical Co., Inc., 11 NLRB, No. 65 (1939).
252. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., supra note 9; Western Felt Works, supra
note 92.
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interim offer of reemployment by the respondent employer in different
positions." 3 The status of the Board's doctrine, which had some support
in the courts, that "unclean hands" on the part of a union or employees
will not avail the employer as a defense,2  has been thrown in doubt
by the Fansteel decision. The Board approves another angle of the clean
hands doctrine, however, and holds that an employee who offered to assist
an employer to violate the Act is entitled to no relief under the Act.Y3
The equitable principle of laches is not applicable to proceedings on
a complaint of unfair labor practices under the Act, the Board has held.
The lapse of two years and seven months between the unfair practice
and the complaint based thereon, does not bar or estop maintenance of
the proceeding, but where it is the complainant union instead of the Board
which has caused a long delay, however, a modified form of the doctrine
of laches is applied by deducting from back pay the period prior to the
filing of the charges. -"0 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rather naively
placed itself in an ambiguous position by declining to punish an employer
-for contempt for failure to comply with the order of that court enforcing
a Board order requiring reinstatement of an employee "without dis-
crimination against" two other union employees already employed, on
the ground that the employer was "placed in a dilemma by an order
which was self-contradictory" in that it entitled all three employees to
jobs whereas only two are needed at the plant"' 7 The court might well
have subjected the Board's order to such scrutiny before issuing its own
decree of enforcement. It is no defense for failure to comply with a
back pay order that the" Board did not determine the amount of back
wages. Amounts "can best be determined by the parties involved, who
can calculate the same by applying the standard set out in the Board's
order. Only if they are unable to do so will it be necessary for the Board
to fix the amounts."2 8
A vital distinction is made by the Board in connection with the defense
of settlement between settlement agreements between the parties alone
and agreements to which an agent of the Board is a party. Consistently
the Board has held that a settlement or strike settlement agreement be-
253. In re Eastern Footwear Corp., 8 NLRB, No. 154 (1938).
254. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co.. 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933), ccrt.
denied, (1939) 6 U. S. L. Wa=V 914; N. L. R. B. v. Hearst, 4 L. R. R. 165, 165 (C. C. A.
9th, Mar. 23, 1939).
255. In re Thompson Cabinet Co., 11 NLRB, No. 99 (1939).
256. In re Colorado Milling Co., 11 NLRB, No. 16 (1939); Back pay was ordered
for a period of three and one-half years. But cf. In re Cherry Cotton Mfills, 11 XLRB,
No. 44 (1939) (two-year period between transfer of case from trial e.,'aminer to NLR.B
without an intermediate report, and decision of NLRB, vas e-cluded in computation of
back pay). In re Inland Lime & Stone Co., 8 NLRB, No. 116 (1938).
257. N. L. R. B. v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
258. N. L. R. B. v. Fashion Piece Dye Works, 100 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 3d, 193S);
cf. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., supra note 9.
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tween an employer and the complainant union is no bar to prosecution
of the unfair labor practice proceeding or an order commanding rein-
statement and back pay.2 9 The Board properly will brook no encroach-
ment upon the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 10(c)
to remedy unfair labor practices. The Board, representing the United
States, is a party in interest in all proceedings relating to unfair labor
practices under the Act.2 0 All compromise or settlement agreements
between the parties will, therefore, be "closely scrutinized" by the Board,
although in a proper case it may exercise its discretion and refuse to
disturb the settlement.261 If the Board finds that the agreement will not
tend to effectuate the policies of the Act, no weight will be given to the
agreement.262 An agreement by a union which purports to bind it from
filing charges under the Act on behalf of employees is contrary to the
policy of the Act, and therefore of no effect whatsoever upon the union's
power so to initiate proceedings before the Board.263 Nor can employees
be estopped from assertion of their rights under the Act by a so-called
strike-settlement agreement in fact dictated by the employer although
purportedly the result of collective bargaining.2 4 Necessarily, settlement




Effective administration of the Act as a single piece of legislation
requires that the Board have the respect and confidence of both manage-
ment and labor; the broader objectives of the Statute can be achieved
through no other means. The specific purpose of the Act is to promote
collective bargaining; but its ultimate end is that the nation's labor
problem may be solved without resort to the stultifying status quo of
dictatorship or the senseless suffering of revolution. For change has so
outrun time during the past decade that the term "labor problem" has
a new content. It is broader - and considerably more intense. Through-
out the world there is an inevitable force behind the demand of industrial
and clerical workers for the social security not heretofore available below
the wealthier middle classes. Depressions and recessions have run up the
head of pressure behind this demand. The demand has in turn instilled
into the old concept of the labor problem new economic and political
259. In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 6 NLRB 325 (1938); In re Ingram Mfg. Co,,
5 NLRB 908 (1938); In re Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB, No. 51 (1938).
260. In re Ingram Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB 903 (1938).
261. Id.
262. In re Shuron Optical Co., 11 NLRB, No. 65 (1939).
263. In re Ingram Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB 908 (1938).
264. In re Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB, No. 51 (1938).
265. In re Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 11 NLRB, No. 67 (1939).
[Vol. 48: 11521198
"DISCRIMINATION" UNDER INr. L. R. A.
problems of distribution of wealth, and of mass markets. The demand
must be met. The problem must be solved. It is the policy of the United
States to rely upon the collective bargaining process to make the advances
to meet this demand.00
To shape the collective bargaining process as an effective tool, Congress
found it necessary to lift it entirely out of the field of the common law.
That field had become too confused for proper development of labor law.
Confusion is commonplace enough in our jurisprudence. Little wonder:
it is split by evanescent boundaries of state and national jurisdiction; it
teems with opposing state rules varying through 48 shades of incon-
sistency; it stirs with embryo uniform laws well enough conceived but
foredoomed to interminable gestation. But the common law of labor
towered monstrously above this confusion.
Thus it was that the great Supreme Court decisions of April, 1937,
held infinite promise. They made possible under the Act a single con-
sistent body of law applicable to almost all important industries insofar
as the entire collective bargaining process was concerned. Then the
Board began administering the Act through a process of reading things
into it which just were not there - such as direct protection by Section
8(3) of all types of "union activities." To halt this tendency the Supreme
Court evoked tests of vague, indefinable and elastic meaning: "unlawful
strike;" "tort;" "breach of contract;" "right of selection." These tests
may end the unifying influence of the jurisdictional decisions of April,
1937. Certainly they will not promote "respect and confidence" between
management and labor. In the long run employers would profit more
through a consistent and predictable body of law governing the collective
bargaining process than they will in standing on supposed rights under
the enigmatic decisions of February 27, 1939. And if labor is patient
enough to bargain collectively under protection of the Act, it will need
no protection for acts of violence.
The Board has gone too far in one direction; the Court too far in
another. Happily the solution is simple: if each gives ground they will
meet at the Act as it is written; let each use the criteria of the Act; let
the Board not create extra-statutory unfair labor practices; let the Court
not revive those tests of "legality" and "right" whiich long ago emas-
culated the common law of labor and left it an impotent thing- worse
than futile for the task of providing "ring, rules, and referee" for the
battle of this century.
266. Declaration of Policy in § 1 of NLRA; cases cited supra note 45.
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